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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: First, to explain how learning shapes consumer 
behaviour over a comestible (experience) good. Second, to examine the role of feedback 
information and information aggregation for consumer choices and market performance in 
markets for experience goods. Third, to understand how firms react to heterogeneous 
consumer choices in the supermarket industry when faced with institutional constraints.
To shed light on how learning influences consumer choices over time in particular when 
new products or new characteristics are introduced, we employ in Chapter 2 a model of 
reinforcement learning over products as well as characteristics and apply it to yoghurt 
drink purchases from a large British consumer panel. We find that learning over both, 
products and characteristics, is important in explaining consumer choices over time.
How consumer choices are influenced by the choice of others is analysed in Chapter 3 
which introduces and studies a new model of aggregate information cascades. We find that 
if only one of two possible actions is observable —say, how many others bought a 
particular product but not how many chose not to buy it—only one type of cascade arises 
in equilibrium. Herding only takes place on the observable action.
A different angle on how the provision of information bears on choices is taken in Chapter 
4 on learning trust. Here we examine the effect of different forms of feedback information 
to consumers and sellers in a market with sequential exchange. Experimental evidence 
shows that both feedback information on sellers’ history to consumers but also feedback 
information about sellers trading history to other sellers improves market efficiency.
How firms optimally react to institutional constraints when consumer choice heterogeneity 
is important is developed in Chapter 5 in a model of supermarket entry into different store 
formats and applied to data from the UK. We are interested in estimating the cost of the 
institutional constraint of restrictive planning regulation. We find that the institutional set­
up matters but the impact of restrictive planning regulation on firm profits is small and 
increases barriers to entry for large supermarkets only.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: First, to explain how learning shapes consumer behav­
iour over a comestible (experience) good. Second, to examine the role of feedback information 
and information aggregation for consumer choices and market performance in markets for 
experience goods. Third, to understand how firms react to heterogeneous consumer choices 
in the supermarket industry when faced with institutional constraints.
The second chapter focusses on how learning influences consumer choices over time, in 
particular when new products or new characteristics are introduced. We employ an adaptive 
learning model — reinforcement learning — that assumes that the behaviour of consumers 
confronted with a repeated choice problem is shaped by their past experiences and is best 
described by a dynamic learning rule. The model takes both, learning over products and 
characteristics, into account and applies it to yoghurt drink purchases from a large British 
consumer panel. In this context consumers are faced with a simple recurring decision prob­
lem — buying a good in the supermarket where the quality is not perfectly known a priori. 
This uncertainty plays, of course, a particularly important role when a new characteristic is 
introduced. Additionally, the evaluation of quality might be heterogeneous and imprecise, 
i.e.. consumers may need a while to find out whether they prefer a particular taste over 
another. Since each purchasing decision is relatively unimportant to the individual con-
1
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sumer a boundedly rational reinforcement model may explain actual individual choices well. 
This view is confirmed in the empirical analysis. The results suggest that consumers’ past 
purchasing history plays an important role in their present choices. But not only product 
familiarity is important, consumers decompose products into characteristics and these char­
acteristics experiences matter when deciding between different products the next time. This 
plays a particularly important role when consumers decide to switch to a product with a 
new characteristic: If consumer switch from one product to another they are more likely to 
switch to a new product that shares some of the characteristics of the previously consumed 
one. These results are robust to the introduction of price changes of both, purchased and not 
purchased, goods and disregarding learning altogether leads to an significant upward bias 
in both of the price elasticities. Including household characteristics into the analysis sheds 
further light on choice heterogeneity over time.
How consumer choices are influenced by choices of others is analysed in Chapter 3 where 
we introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades. We find that if only one of two 
possible actions i.e. how many people chose a particular product but not how many chose 
not to buy it is observable only one type of cascade arises in equilibrium. This information 
structure arises very naturally in many applications. Consider, for example, a venture capital 
firm who discusses a project with an inventor who needs capital to develop a new product. 
The inventor may gladly mention the credits he has already secured with other investors but 
probably wants to disclose the number of investors who have rejected the project. Or if we 
take the example of a central agency in the health sector who must decide how to disclose 
information on the adoption of a new treatment. It has the choice to inform the doctors 
on how many others have already decided to adopted the new treatment or on how many 
have considered it but decided not to adopt. Our central result is that only one type of 
cascade arises in equilibrium, the aggregate "up cascade" on the observable action. Herding 
never occurs on the unobservable action. This is crucial for the example of the health agency 
that can decide which information to disseminate. If it chooses to disclose the number of
2
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doctors who have adopted the procedure the only cascade that can arise is one where all 
adopt and vice versa. Depending on the severity of different bad cascades, the central agency 
may optimally decide to withhold information. So the aggregate information set up that is 
introduced here has not only several intriguing properties — some in stark contrast to the 
predictions of the standard model — it also has potentially important policy implications. 
We then take our theory to the laboratory. The experimental data suggests that our model 
does fairly well. We find that the main comparative statics go all in the right direction.
A different angle on how the provision of information bears on choices is taken in the 
chapter on learning trust. Here we examine the effect of different forms of feedback infor­
mation to consumers and sellers in a market with sequential exchange. These markets are 
particularly prone to moral hazard and orthodox theory predicts that providing consumers 
with information about sellers’ trading history should help alleviate this problem. Experi­
mental evidence shows that feedback information on sellers’ history to consumers does indeed 
boost market performance. However, the key finding is that two-sided market transparency 
where both, consumers and sellers, have access to sellers’ trading history improves market 
performance even further which may be important for the design of new electronic markets.
How firms optimally react to institutional constraints when consumer choice heterogene­
ity is important is developed in a model of supermarket entry into different store formats and 
applied to data from the UK. Here the interest lies in estimating the cost of the institutional 
constraint of restrictive planning regulation. The change in the planning regulation mainly 
in 1996 centralised the planning regulation and changed it to encourage in-town (small) store 
formats over out-of-town (large) store formats. As a result we would expect it to restrict the 
number of large stores and increase the number of small stores in equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, 
after the reforms we do see an increase in town centre stores and an increase in smaller store 
formats. However, other factors may have also affected this shift towards the smaller store 
formats. In particular changes in consumer demand patterns or strategy diversifications by 
several firms in the supermarket industry may have contributed significantly to this increase
3
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in smaller store formats. Thus incorporating a model of heterogeneous consumer demand 
is crucial in isolating the effect of planning regulation on market structure and firm profits. 
This is implemented by estimating the structural parameters of the profit function and iso­
lating the increase in fixed costs that is associated with more restrictive planning regulation. 
The results show that the institutional set-up matters but the impact of restrictive planning 
regulation on firm profits is small and increases barriers to entry for large supermarkets only. 
Each Chapter of this thesis can also be read as a stand alone article.
4
Chapter 2 
Learning to Consume - on the 
Importance of Characteristics
2.1 Introduction
Consumer choices have generally been seen as a sequence of rational decisions. Recent 
research has pointed out that this might not always be the case. Several recent empirical 
papers have found violations of the most general rational choice assumption for a significant 
portion of the population. For instance Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003) find that on 
an aggregated level the general indicator of rational choice, the General Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (GARP), is violated over 10% of the time1 using a repeated cross-section of the 
Family Expenditure Survey for Britain. Mattei (1994) using a micro level Swiss consumer 
panel dataset, shows that half of the households in the panel violate GARP. In a more recent 
micro level study that investigates consumer rationality Blow, Browning and Crawford (2003) 
look at milk purchases in a Danish consumer panel . They find GARP violations in 16% of 
the cases and the purchase behaviour of over 40% of their sample cannot be rationalised with
lrThe GARP rejections axe mainly concentrated in the upper tail of the distribution.
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a linear characteristics model2. An earlier experimental study by Sippel (1997) documents 
that even in a very limited choice situation GARP had to be rejected in approximately half 
of the cases.3 One lesson from these apparent rationality failures may be that consumers 
use simpler algorithms to make consumption choices and learn about products and their 
characteristics over time. But this is at its heart an empirical question.
Empirical research in the past has taken two different routes in explaining consumer pur­
chasing decisions over time. One originates in the marketing literature following Guadagni 
and Little’s (1983) first use of scanner data of ground coffee purchases over Erdem (1996, 
2004) to Ho and Chong (2003) work on modelling stock keeping unit (SKU) choices, focussing 
particularly on the effect of marketing mix strategies and shopping experience on consumer 
brand choice. This research uses scanner data or data that is collected at the point of sale 
in combination with loyalty card information, so that the researcher observes very detailed 
information about the product but no information about the household. While Guadagni 
and Little are mainly concerned with brand loyalty4, Erdem decomposes the product into 
its characteristics (modelling brand as one of them) and investigates whether the similarity 
between different characteristics explain product choice. Ho and Chong additionally differen­
tiate between consumption and shopping experience where the latter applies to all familiar 
and available characteristic levels and products that the consumer could be purchasing. 
None of them investigate the effect of consumer characteristics on the individual shopping 
behaviour, nor have they looked at the introduction of a new product or characteristic.
The other route evolved from Gorman’s work on pure product characteristics (1980) to 
estimating non-parametric revealed preferences that are consistent with these characteristics 
models.5 This literature places the consumer choice problem in a fully rational and static
2See e.g. Gorman (1980), Lancaster (1966) or Heckman and Scheinkman (1987).
3A more recent similar experimental study by Mattei (2000) confirmed Sippel’s results with GARP 
violations between 25% and 44%.
4 There is a large marketing literature in brand loyality: some of the main most recent papers are Akgura 
et al. (2004), Erdem (1998), Osselaer (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999, 2004).
5See e.g. Blow, Browning and Crawford (2003).
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setting while additionally assuming a time invariant utility function. There are some very 
recent extensions by Crawford and Rickman (2006) that look at product purchases in a 
dynamic framework splitting consumption into a rational and addictive part over whole 
products. Our model is closely related to a product characteristic version of their model 
that gives zero weight to the rational part of consumption and makes some more structural 
assumptions on the "addiction" mechanism.
This paper builds on both of these strands of literature and extends the analysis to a 
dynamic framework of product characteristics. We incorporate consumer learning as well as 
demographic characteristics to explain - at least partially - choice heterogeneity over time 
and estimate our model using a large British consumer panel dataset, that covers all grocery 
purchases for a three year period.
But, what kind of consumer learning? In this context agents are faced with repeated 
decision problems. The consumer is going on a regular basis to a supermarket to buy gro­
ceries, where the goods are typically experience goods. One has to try them out before the 
quality is known. Also the evaluation of this quality might be heterogeneous and imprecise 
for example whether I liked the taste of a particular characteristic. Adaptive learning mod­
els - like reinforcement learning models - attempt to describe exactly this, the behaviour of 
agents confronted with repeated decision problems assuming they use simple learning rules. 
Additionally experimental evidence has shown that these reinforcement learning models de­
scribe actual human behaviour quite well.6Also because each purchase decision is relatively 
unimportant to the individual consumer a boundedly-rational behaviour may explain actual 
choices well. 7
In the past one major obstacle for empirically analysing micro-level consumer choice be­
haviour was the absence of micro-level data that combined detailed purchasing and household 
information over time. The latest availability of micro-level consumer choice data enables us
6 See Erev and Roth (1998).
7In a recent theory paper Hopkins (2006) studied the effects of this type of adaptive consumer learning 
over two types of product quality on firm pricing.
7
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to take a closer look at individual shopping behaviour in conjunction with the demographic 
characteristics of the shopper. In this paper we use data from the TNS British consumer 
panel focussing on probiotic yoghurt drink purchases.
Why probiotic yoghurt drinks? With a comparatively low number of characteristics 
probiotic yoghurt drinks are rather simple, and are additionally very homogeneous within 
their characteristic space.8 They are also increasingly popular hence we have a reasonably 
big heterogeneous consumer sample. The market for probiotic yoghurt drinks has also seen a 
large number of successful new characteristic introductions during or just before our sample 
period. The implementation of a new products makes learning a paritcular important issue. 
Looking at a successful product introduction also helps us to understand learning from 
the very beginning so we don’t have to make assumptions about initial conditions. Thus 
it can serve as an ideal benchmark of understanding consumer preferences and learning 
over products and characteristics. Concerns about separability from other consumption or 
labour market decisions may be not as acute with yoghurt drinks as with other product 
innovations that, more often than not, are new durables like consumer electronics. An 
additional advantage of this data set is that it not only contains barcode level product, 
characteristic and price information it also entails detailed information on the purchasing 
household. Thus we can incorporate a large amount of observable consumer heterogeneity 
into our estimation.
Our results suggest that consumers purchasing history plays an important part in their 
present product choice. But not only product familiarity is important, consumers decom­
pose products into characteristics and these characteristic experiences matter when deciding 
between different products. This is particularly crucial when consumers decide whether to 
switch to a product with a new characteristic.
The paper is organised as follows: The reinforcement model is discussed in Section 2, 
Section 3 introduces the estimation strategy, Section 4 gives an overview over the data and
8 See Bajari and Benkard (2001) for a model if product characteristics are unobserved.
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the results axe shown in Section 5, Section 6  concludes.
2.2 T he m odel
The goal of the model is to predict which product j  the consumer i will choose on a purchase 
occasion given her purchase history, the price of the product and her personal characteristics.
The model assumes that in each time period t (purchase occasion) the consumer chooses 
from J  different products. Let Uijt denote the utility to consumer i of purchasing product j  
at time t consisting of an observed component Vijn and an unobserved component The 
utility may depend on observed and unobserved characteristics of products, observed and 
unobserved characteristics of consumers, including their purchasing history.
Uijt — V%jt 4“ &ijt ( 2*1)
=  otjZijt +  IjPjt +  (3jXit +  £ijt (2-2)
Individual household i's utility is the sum of an intrinsic valuation Zijt and the associ­
ated price of the product and a vector of household characteristics Xu. The error structure 
captures serial correlation in characteristic-level and product-specific utilities. The additive 
form has been used by most prior models and is adopted here for simplicity.
The intrinsic value Z^t of the product j  consists of both product-specific (Cijt) and 
characteristic-level {Cinit) experiences. Formally,
N  L
Zijt — ^   ^ — Cinit • Ijnl +  Cijt (2-3)
n=l 1=1
Cjnit is a vector of observed characteristics-level experiences of individual i of character- 
ist level I in characteristic n, it is multiplied by an indicator variable Ijni is 1 if product j
9
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has characteristic level I in characteristic n and 0  otherwise, this is added to the overall 
product-specific experience Cijt of individual i of product j  at time t - or in other words 
the ideosynchratic likening of the product beyond it’s characteristics. Over time consumers 
accumulate product and characteristic experiences. For example consumer Smith's cumula­
tive product experience or in other words her cumulative attraction to product 2 = {original, 
light, yakult} is a sum of her cumulative experience for Yakult, original flavours and light 
products.
^ S m ith ,2,t  =  0 S m ith ,orig inal,t "I- "t- 0 S m ith ,ya k u lt,t “I- 0 S m ith ,2,t
These cumulative experiences or attractions for the characteristics as well as the product 
as a whole are updated over time as follows:
G inlt =z 4*k ' C in l(t—1) lin lt (2-4)
Cijt =  0p ' Cij(t—1) lijt (2-5)
where <f>k and (f>p are decay factors. This updating rule will be called reinforcement learn­
ing, upon receiving a payoff the agent updates the respective choice propensities. The 1 ^  
describes an incremental reinforcement that consumer i derives form level I in characteristic 
n in time t. Additionally she receives an incremental reinforcement from the product j  as
a whole. The distinction between the two incremental reinforcements is that characteristic-
level reinforcement affects the intrinsic value of all products that have similar characteristic 
levels while the product-level reinforcement does not. This captures on the one hand the 
products uniqueness as well as the shared characteristics with other products.
Characteristic level incremental reinforcement for a characteristic level I in time period 
depends on whether it was chosen in time period t — 1 .
10
CHAPTER 2. LEARNING TO CONSUME
0
1 if level I in characteristic n was chosen in t — 1
otherwise
(2.6)
In addition to characteristic-level reinforcement the product-level reinforcement captures the
consumer’s idiosyncratic liking for a product beyond the shared characteristic levels. This
will therefore only affect the product’s own cumulative attraction and will not influence the 
attractions of other products. So the incremental reinforcement depends on whether the 
product j  was chosen in time period t — 1 .
Thus the more often a product or a characteristic has been chosen in the past, the higher 
the cumulative product experience and the higher the intrinsic valuation of this product. This
of choosing this product at the next purchasing occasion.
Supplementary to the assumption that consumer characteristics influence their choices 
over time this model is based on the behavioural proposition that the consumer accumulates
on their familiarity. In the psychological literature Alba and Hutchinson (2000) argue that 
since the grocery-shopping environment is highly complex, consumers often rely on recall to 
recognise products. So, when consumers look at the grocery display without preconceptions, 
characteristic level and product familiarity are likely to influence how easily a product is 
recognised on the shelf.
Switching between different products or different characteristics can be interpreted as 
variety-seeking behaviour.9 A consumer seeks variety if the conditional probability of choos­
ing a product on an occasion (given that the same product was chosen on any prior occasion)
9For a comprehensive review on variety-seeking behaviour see Kahn (1998).
l i j t  ^
1 if product j  was chosen in t — 1
(2.7)
0 otherwise
V
leads to an increased utility associated with this product and therefore a higher probability
characteristic level and product-level experiences and her consumption experience depends
11
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is smaller than the unconditional probability of choosing the product. In our model variety- 
seeking on a product level would occur if aj < 0 , this might be due to satiation of a particular 
characteristic or the product as a whole. Switching to an unfamiliar product characteristic 
may be caused by satiation on the part of the consumer or it may be the reaction to a change 
in the relative price (i.e. a change in due to a promotion).
2.3 T he E stim ation Strategy
To estimate our product choice model we use the multinomial logit estimator dating back 
to McFaddens (1974) early work on random utility models that emulates our choice rule 
particularly well. We assume that the error £ijt is extreme value independent over i , j  and t. 
We include the consumer behaviour over time as the accumulated attractions in the exoge­
nous variable, prices and household characteristics as specified above. So if individuals are 
reinforcement learners over characteristics we would expect the estimated aj coefficients to 
be positive. 10 If the marginal consumption experience decreases with characteristic familiar­
ity, we would expect satiation to occur. This can be one of the reasons for variety-seeking 
between characteristics. In this case we would expect the aj coefficients to be negative. 11 
The choice probabilities have the following structure:
Pr* = (2.8)
} 2 j t  exp(%t)
or more specifically:
exp (ajZjj, +  'yj Pjt +  ^ X a)
,J1 Y.j’ exP + ifPj’t + PjXit)
10There are several possibilities of entering past consumption in the utility function. Adamowicz (1994) 
enteres the number of times a particular product is chosen, rather than simply a dummy for the immediately 
previous choice. Erdem (1996) looks at the number of times a particular attribute was chosen in the past 
without reinforcing the product as a whole.
11 For empirical evidence on this type of variety seeking behaviour see e.g. McAlister (1982) or Erdem 
(1996).
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where Pr^t is the probability of household i choosing product j  at time t. The Vijt include 
the product and characteristic level familiarity (Zyt), the price components (Pjt) and the 
household characteristics component (Xu) that might all effect household’s choice behaviour. 
The choice probabilities sum to one. In order to identify the model we must normalise one 
of the coefficients to zero. We use the incumbent product as the baseline outcome and 
thus all estimates are relative to this baseline outcome. To estimate the multinomial logit 
model we maximise the log-likelihood function using the Newton-Raphson algorithm. The 
log likelihood can be derived by defining an indicator variable for each household i, and 
product j
lij — ^
1 if product j was chosen
(2.10)
0  otherwise
where for each i at a particular point in time t only one /y  is equal to one:
i  j
In L =  EE /y in  Pr^ (2 .1 1 )
i= 1 j= 1
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable - the cumulative product and characteristic 
attractions - still gives us unbiased estimates as long as it is uncorrelated with the current 
error and the errors are independent over time. In order to account for the dependence of 
observation within households we cluster on households.
The estimated a , (3 and 7  coefficients can only be directly interpreted in terms of their 
sign and their significance level. For example a positive sign on a particular a  coefficient 
makes it more likely that this product is chosen with increasing Z's (product & characteristic 
familiarity). Consumers are not yet satiated with this product. A negative sign on the a  
coefficient on the other hand makes it more likely that consumers switch away from this 
product - seek product variety- with increasing Z's. To interpret the magnitude of the effect 
we calculate marginal effects for the different a , (3 and 7 .
13
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One drawback of using the multinomial logit model is its restrictive substitution pat­
tern. It can only capture proportional substitution across alternatives, if one characteristic 
becomes more attractive i.e. due to a promotion the increase in this characteristic’s probabil­
ity necessarily means a proportional decrease in the probability of the other characteristics. 
In other words the multinomial logit model has the property of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). This might be particularly crucial if new choices become available. In 
our case this would be e.g. new characteristics like strawberry flavour. We undertook two 
robustness checks to test the severity of the IIA restriction in our setting. First we esti­
mated the basic characteristic reinforcement attraction model without price or consumer 
characteristics with a small random sample of our population using a multinomial probit 
which can represent any substitution pattern. Because the probit probabilities do not have a 
closed-form expression we approximate the choice probabilities numerically using the GHK 
12simulator13. As a second test we excluded the newly introduced characteristics (strawberry 
and multifruit flavour) and reestimated the multinomial logit of the basic model (only char­
acteristic level reinforcement). The Hausman and McFadden (1984) test was used to test 
whether the two estimates were significantly different from each other.
2.4 T he data
We us the TNS Consumer Panel from January 2002-December 2004. This unbalanced panel 
consists of around 50,000 households over the period of 3 years, their yearly socioeconomic 
characteristics all fast moving consumer good purchases (these include all groceries but also 
cleaning products etc.). We extracted all probiotic yoghurt drink purchases. There is some 
attrition, so we observe households on average for 650 days. 6,308 of those households
12Geweke, 1989; Hajivassiliou and McFadden, 1998; Keane, 1994.
13A summary of probit simulators is given in Hajivassiliou et al.(1996). In a comparison they found the 
GHK to be the most accurate in the setting they examined.
14
CHAPTER 2. LEARNING TO CONSUME
purchase probiotic yoghurt drinks at least once within the 3 years.14Since we are interested 
in repeated purchasing behaviour over time we constrained the sample to individuals that 
have bought a probiotic yoghurt drink at least ten times during the three years. This 
leaves us with 1883 households that bought on average 26 probiotic yoghurt drinks in 3 
years. This amounts to 50,082 yoghurt drink purchases. The purchasing data contains 
information on date of purchase, store type, store postcode, extensive item characteristics 
on a barcode level, price, quantity and offer description between January 2002 and December 
2004. The demographic data comprises yearly information on age and employment status 
of the main shopper, household size, social class, number and age of children, household 
durable equipment (cars, appliances), most frequent shopping method, hours watched TV 
per week and total spend on fast moving consumer goods. The purchasing variables are 
collected continuously every day and each product has a unique identifier on the bar code 
level. Equally each household can be identified by a unique number and is updated every 
year. The data only covers home consumption.
2.4.1 The Product Category
We chose probiotic yoghurt drinks because it is a new product that is only storable for a 
short period of time so we do not have to consider bulk purchases or other shopping patterns 
that are only induced by the longevity of a product. Additionally probiotic yoghurt drinks 
have a rather small number of characteristic and are homogeneous within their characteristic 
space. One major advantage is that there have been several successful product introductions 
in this category in and just before the period of observation. One of the three major brands - 
Muller - introduced their probiotic yoghurt drink in March 2002 and even though the official 
introduction of the current market leader Danone already happened in 2001 a large number 
of households tried it for the first time in the middle of 2002. The third major brand that has
14TNS estimated that their purchasing data reflects approx. 80% of total food consumption and their 
sample is representative of the total UK population.
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been in the market the longest is Yakult. On top of new brand introduction the companies 
also introduced two new flavours during our observation period, strawberry in early 2003 
and multifruit in the middle of 2003. This allows us to observe the purchase history from the 
very beginning and see exactly how characteristic and product familiarity influence consumer 
choices. We restrict the brands to the three main competitors due to estimatability. 15
Probiotic yoghurt drinks have three different characteristics flavour, fat content and 
brand, where fat content has only two levels (light, normal), flavour has six levels (orig­
inal16, orange, peach, raspberry, strawberry and multifruit) and we observe three major 
brands (Danone, Yakult, Muller) in our sample. Since not all brands come in all the flavours 
we do not have 3x2x6 but only 10 different products.
We observe a considerable amount of heterogeneity between purchasing behaviour. The 
number of individual yoghurt drink purchases ranges between 10 and 210 times within 3 years 
with a mean of 26 times. Households purchase their yoghurt drinks on average every 21 days. 
The average household shops at 3 different stores and 2 different storetypes17 over the 3 year 
period. Table 2.1 shows the market shares of the 10 different products within our sample, 
the biggest is still the incumbent Yakult original with slightly over 15% but aggregating over 
the different characteristics Danone accounts for more than 50% of all purchases within our 
sample.
There is significant price heterogeneity, both, between products and characteristics but 
also over time. Figure 2.2 shows the kernel density distribution of unit price per liter and unit 
price per pack the difference between the two is mainly due to Yakult being packaged in 65 
milliliter bottles whereas the other two brands are in 1 0 0  milliliter bottles. Since households 
choose between these prepackaged sizes their price comparison will more likely be on the 
pack than on the milliliter base, particularly since one bottle is advertised as one daily
15These three brands amount to over 90% of our sample.
16The original flavour is similar to a "plain" yoghurt taste
17There are eight different storetypes, the four biggest supermarket chains (Asda, Morrison/Safeway, 
Sainsbury, Tesco), discounter, co-ops, cornershops and the upmarket supermarket chain Waitrose.
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portion. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the kernel density distributions of price per pack of the 
different characteristics. We see that the low fat is more expensive than the normal fat and 
even after adjusting for size Yakult is still the most expensive brand with the smallest price 
variation. Fruit flavours are less expensive than the original flavour but there is no obvious 
price difference between new flavour introductions (strawberry, multifruit) and old ones. 
The price differences between different storetypes are shown in Figure 4 and our empirical 
analysis indicates that individuals usually compare prices between different products within 
the same storetype. This is not so surprising since at least for our sample the price ranking 
between different storetypes stays rather constant over the three year period (see Figure 
2.6). Overall prices have fallen very slightly over the three year period mainly due to price 
reductions from Danone. New flavours were introduced in the middle of the price range with 
higher than average price variation (see Figure 2.6).
2.4.2 Household data
Every household included in this analysis has purchased probiotic yoghurt drinks at least 
ten times in the last 3 years and did not have missing household characteristics. Figure 
1 shows the distribution over number of different products, brands and flavours purchased 
by households. Most households purchase two different brands and three different flavours, 
but around 1% of households have tried all ten products. Further household characteristics 
included in the analysis are summarised in Table 2, so 80% of the main shoppers are women, 
the average age is 48 and they watch on average 18 hours television per week. Household size 
is on average 2 .8  and we will look at single households separately to see whether switching 
behaviour is due to variety seeking or different preferences within households.
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2.4.3 Switching
Since we axe interested in how past product and characteristic familiarity shape future choices 
we look at the transition probabilities between different characteristics and different prod­
ucts. We count the transitions from one purchasing occasion to the next and document 
them in a transition matrix where the rows reflect the initial values, and the columns reflect 
the final values. We do this separately for singles and larger households and neither uncon­
ditional characteristic nor product switching patterns seem significantly different for single 
households. Tables 2.5 to 2.7 show that brand has the lowest switching probability with 
more than 80% of the probability mass on the main diagonal, fat content is also a highly 
persistent characteristic in households choices, but they rather stick with the normal fat con­
tent than the light version. Most of the switching takes place between different flavours and 
in particular between the different fruit flavours (in contrast if a household has consumed the 
original flavour last period it will do so again this period with 85% probability). Looking at 
the whole product transition matrix this impression is confirmed with the lowest switching 
probability for Yakult original (21.5% probability of switching from last purchase) and the 
highest for Muller peach (71.43 % probability of choosing something different this period) 
and the main switching within brands across different fruit flavours (see Table 2.9&2.10).
A good example of individual switching behaviour is documented in Figure 7 where we 
show 5 typical switching patterns of single households. Household A is a good example 
of someone trying out a different brand once and sticking with it without ever switching 
back. Households B and C switch between different characteristics of the same brand (fat 
content for B and flavour for C). The difference is that A has made the transition to the 
new characteristic after three trials whereas C is still undecided between raspberry and 
strawberry but the interval between switches decreases. Household D switches between 
three characteristics of the same brand and does not seem to have settled down on one in 
particular one and household E’s purchases are all over the place switching between all three
18
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characteristic types, the rarest of switching patterns.
But what happens to switching over time? If we believe in a learning based model 
of behaviour one would expect behaviour to settle down after some initial period and the 
frequency of switches to decrease over time. Figure 2.8 plots the average number of switches 
across all households over time. On the horizontal axis we use purchase occasions since 
households have different actual shopping frequencies and on the y-axis we document the 
number of average switches. We can see that product and flavour switches decrease over 
time with experience whereas brandswitches stay nearly constant on a significantly lower 
level. In combination with the fact that price variation is not decreasing over time within or 
between characteristics this is one indication that a learning based model fits actual consumer 
purchases quite well.
2.5 The R esults
As a benchmark we estimated the simple product-only reinforcement model. The exogenous 
variables here are only cumulative product attractions but no characteristic attractions, or 
in other words the C'inlts are all equal to zero. In this baseline model we also do not include 
prices or household characteristics or any other covariates. This should give us an indication 
whether adding characteristic familiarity makes a difference. If it does we would learn that 
consumers not only accumulate product but also characteristic experiences when they make 
their purchasing decisions, and that these experiences influence their future purchases. Thus 
characteristic models are not only a parsimonious way of estimating consumer choices but 
they are actually the superior behavioural model. Table 2.9 shows the estimated coefficients 
of the multinomial logit for the different product attractions. We can see that most but not 
all own product attractions are positive and significant. Table 10 now shows the estimated 
coefficients for our model of product and characteristic reinforcement. The two main differ­
ences are that now all own attractions are positive and significant and that the R2 increased
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from 22 to 30 percent. The fact that all own attractions are positive in the characteristics 
model points out that the probability of choosing a particular product again today does 
not only depend on my past experience with this exact product but on my past experience 
with all its characteristics. The overall higher explanatory power of the model confirms 
our behavioural rational that consumers decompose choices over products into choices over 
characteristics.
Looking more closely at our estimates from the product and characteristic level rein­
forcement model reveals that on a characteristic level brand familiarity seems to be more 
important than flavour or fat content. The same brand attractions are positive a number 
of times whereas the same fat content or the same flavour i.e. the coefficient for Muller 
strawberry when looking at Danone strawberry, shows hardly ever a positive and significant 
coefficient. This is over and beyond the familiarity that is already included in our cumulative 
attractions. Our cummulative attractions give equal weight to each characteristic and this 
might be evidence that some characteristics are more important than others. The propensity 
to choose familiar brands is consistent with the finding of Erdem and Keane (1996) where 
consumers were found to avoid less familiar brands because they were not certain about the 
brands’ benefit.
Not Surprisingly including unit price per pack as one of the exogenous variables into the 
model does make a big difference. Table 2.11 shows that the own unitprice per pack coeffi­
cients are significantly negative for all products except Yakult light. This is not unexpected 
since Yakult light exhibits a very similar price pattern than the baseline product of Yakult. 
But own price is not the only important price variable that influences consumer decisions 
the price of competitor products matters as well. 18 Here all the coefficients are positive so 
an increase in the average of competitor product prices within the same storetype leads to
18 For own price we calculate the unitprice per pack (100ml for danone muller products and 65ml for 
yakult). For competitor unit prices we use the unweighted monthly price average of all competitor products 
within the same storetype. We tried several other price averages across regions or only across products but 
this one worked best. Which is not completely surprising since one would expect consumers to compare 
different yoghurt drink prices within the same store rather than across different ones.
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an increase purchasing probability of the incumbent product. Again with the exception of 
Yakult light, here consumers seem not to be influenced by competitor price changes. But 
even though including prices into the model improves the overall explanatory power it does 
not change the significance of the reinforcement coefficients.
Table 2.12 shows the estimated coefficients for the full model including household charac­
teristics. Household characteristics that play a significant role in choosing between different 
products are age and sex of the main shopper. 19 Households with a male main shopper are 
significantly less likely to shop light products. Older main shopper are less likely to purchase 
a new brand and more likely to stick with the original unfruity flavour.
The amount of hours a household watches TV per week has also a differential impact on 
their product purchases. It is solely important for the newest brand - Muller - and increase 
it’s purchasing probability significantly. Changes in weekly TV exposure do not have an 
impact on Danone or Yakult branded products. We cannot distinguish whether the newest 
brand advertises more on television or whether households that watch a lot of television are 
more likely to try out new brands.
To see how strongly our estimates are biased if we do not take learning into account is 
shown in Table 2.12b. Here we estimate the model with prices and household characteris­
tics only. Not only decreases the overall explanatory power of the model form 0.41 to 0.21, 
the remaining coefficients are also consistently biased. This is particularly crucial for the 
own and other price coefficients. All own price coefficients are biased upwards and also the 
influence of competitor price changes is significantly exaggerated for all but two products. 
The household characteristic coefficients are also mostly upward biased when learning is not 
taken into account. Age is still important when choosing a new brand but the coefficients 
are significantly overestimated, the same is true for the hours of TV exposure per week. The 
gender of the household head does not come in significant if learning is ignored. This un­
19 Other household variables that we investigated like employment status, social class or household size do 
not play a significant role.
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derlines the importance of learning when analysing repeated consumer choices of experience 
goods. It also points at the importance of the panel dimension of the data set. Only if we 
can observe the same individual making purchases over time and take their learning patterns 
into account can we correctly assess i.e. own and other price elasticities.
We also estimate the full model for singles only. Table 2.13 shows the results and we can 
see that singles behave very similarly in terms of product and characteristic level reinforce­
ment learning. They also react similarly to changes in product prices, but age has a slightly 
different impact for singles. It does not influence the choice of new brands negatively but 
increasing age makes singles rather less likely to choose light products. Male singles as male 
shoppers of larger households choose significantly less often the light fat version of a product. 
The main difference between only singles and the whole sample seems their reaction to TV 
exposure. TV exposure does not seem to influence purchase decisions for singles at all.
The multinomial logit coefficients are only informative insofar as to whether they are 
positive or negatively significant. We can not infer the direct economic impact from their 
size in this nonlinear model. To understand the economic significance we need to calculate 
marginal effects. One way of understanding the magnitude of the effect of product and 
characteristic familiarity is to look at the difference in the marginal effects after a change 
in this variable. We increase the number of a particular product purchase for everyone and 
calculate the marginal effect before and after this change. The distribution of the difference 
in marginal effects over all products is shown in Figure 2.9. All differences are positive which 
shows that even after increasing product and characteristic experience by 1 0 % consumers 
are not satiated. The positive difference is particularly pronounced for newer characteristics 
like the strawberry flavour that was only introduced halfway dining our sample. Here the 
impact of an additional 1 0 % of experience leads to a 1 2 % higher probability of consuming 
it in the future for Danone strawberry and a 5.5% higher probability for Muller strawberry.
But this impact looks rather modest if we compare it to a 10% own price increase. 
Figure 2.10 shows the impact of a 10% own product price increase and a 10% change in the
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increase of the average of all the other products in the same storetype. As expected all own 
price increases lead to a negative difference in marginal effects with the exception of Yakult 
where consumers seem particularly price inelastic. Muller’s products seem particularly price 
sensitive which might be due to the fact that Muller is the newest brand and has not yet 
established the same brand familiarity/loyalty. This can be very costly and a 10% own 
price increase can lead to up to 50% less purchase probability (e.g. for Muller raspberry). 
An average price increase of all the competitor products by 10% has a comparatively small 
impact on purchase probability. The main beneficiaries seem to be Danone products that 
increase their purchase probability up to 20% (for Danone multifruit).
In terms of household characteristics the biggest impact is the gender of the main shopper 
(Figure 2.11). Increasing the percentage of male shopper by 10% leads to an 11% decrease 
in light product purchases (more pronounced for Yakult than for Danone). Increasing TV 
exposure by 1 0 % (an average extra 1 .8  hours per week) leads only to a modest increase in 
Muller (the newest brand) purchases of around 2.3 % in total. Increasing average age by 10% 
(4.8 years on average) has a very small economic impact it decrease the purchase probability 
of the newest brand and the new flavour introduction by less than one per cent in total. 
Hence we can explain a significant portion of choice heterogeneity by including household 
characteristics.
Concerned about this restrictive property of the IIA assumption we did two robustness 
checks. We estimated the basic characteristic reinforcement attraction model without price or 
consumer characteristics with a small random sample of our population using a multinomial 
probit which can represent any substitution pattern. The results did not look significantly 
different. As a second test we reestimated the multinomial logit of the basic model (only 
characteristic level reinforcement) on a subset of choices (leaving out the new characteristics)
. The Hausman and McFadden (1984) test indicated that the coefficients of the subset of 
alternatives are not significantly different from the full model.
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2TB Conclusion and D iscussion
In a simple framework of reinforcement learning we have shown that both product and 
characteristic-level experiences matter for the product choice of the consumer. We find 
evidence that consumers decompose their consumption choice between products into their 
characteristics and that characteristic familiarity explains a significant part of product choices 
over time. Overall we see that our adaptive learning model does explain consumer choices - 
particularly of new products - well. Our empirical analysis for probiotic yoghurt drinks shows 
that there is no satiation of any of the products or characteristics yet. All the own product 
attraction coefficients are positive and significant. We see more within brand switching than 
across brand switching which is documented in the transition matrix but can also be seen 
in the positive significant same brand attractions versus often insignificant same flavour or 
fat content attraction coefficients. This finding is in line with Erdem & Keane (1996) and 
others who focus on brand loyalty only. Of course our model gives the same weight to all 
characteristics and it would be an interesting extension to test the relative importance of 
the different characteristics.
Including prices does improve the model significantly but does not change the significance 
or sign of the reinforcement coefficients. Both own as well as competitor price changes play 
an important role. The economic impact of a 10% own price increase can decrease product 
purchase probability up to 50%.
Household characteristics have a differential impact on product choices. Older households 
are less likely to switch to the newest brand and male main shoppers are significantly less 
likely to purchase products with a lower fat content. The amount of television watched 
by the main shopper only influences their purchase of the newest brand positively. Single 
households react similarity to product and characteristic familiarity than families. Also 
gender and age play a similar role for singles the only difference in single household behaviour 
is that purchasing decisions do not change with the amount of TV exposure. Thus including
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household characteristics helps us significantly to explain choice heterogeneity over time. To 
understand how learning is distributed over household is interesting but would go beyond 
the scope of this paper. Similarly it could be worthwhile investigating whether households 
can be clustered into meaningful subgroups. For example looking at individuals with lots of 
observations could help to understand the sofar omitted individual effects.
In the future we would like to allow for more general substitution patterns between 
different product characteristic as well as allowing unobserved factors to be correlated over 
time. Since this is not possible within the framework of the multinomial logit model we 
might want to use more flexible simulation based estimators like the multinomial probit. 
So far we have only checked the robustness of our multinomial logit estimates with a small 
random subsample and only for the case without household characteristics and prices. Here 
the results looked very similar indicating that the IIA property of the multinomial logit does 
not pose a crucial restriction in this simple case.20 This might change when looking at the 
total sample and including other exogenous variables.
20 Due to computational restrictions we could so far only reestimate the model for this very small random 
subsample.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Product market shares
Product Frequency Percent
danone multifruit 2,077 4.15
danone orange 7,354 14.68
danone original 6,751 13.48
danone original light 6,993 13.96
danone strawberry 4,671 9.33
muller peach 3,521 7.03
muller raspberry 5,408 10.8
muller strawberry 3,456 6.9
yakult original 7,656 15.29
yakult original light 2,195 4.38
Total 50,082 100
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
mean std
Stores
total number of stores 1839.00
# of stores by HH 3.26 1.90
# of storetypes by HH 2.53 1.18
purchases
HH tenure 654.89 305.10
Purchase Frequency 21.31 43.90
# of products by HH 3.99 1.85
# of brands by HH 1.81 0.69
# of flavours by HH 3.09 1.45
Learning
Attraction "light" 20.54 20.01
Attraction "flavour" 17.26 19.34
Attraction "brand" 19.72 20.00
Attraction "product" 15.00 17.00
Attraction "z" 72.37 74.52
households
HH size 2.83 1.27
% of female shoppers 81.84
Age 48.14 15.01
7V
weekly TV hours 18.52 11.04
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Table 2.3: Transition matrix light
all
light light
singles
Light 0 1 0 1 Total
0 92.19 7.81 90.77 9.23 100
1 34.17 65.83 31.41 68.59 100
Total 81.51 18.49 77.33 22.67 100
Table 2.4: Transition matrix brand
all
brand
singles
brand
Brand danone muller yakult danone muller yakult Total
Danone 88.77 7.23 4.00 90.00 5.97 4.03 100
Muller 15.46 81.38 3.16 16.69 81.25 2.06 100
Yakult 11.83 4.27 83.91 12.97 2.37 84.66 100
Total 55.57 24.77 19.65 59.27 20.40 20.33 100
Table 2.5. 
All
Flavour
Transition matrix flavour (all)
multifruit orange original peach raspberry strawberry Total
Multifruit 41.84 17.11 13.69 3.21 3.84 20.32 100
Orange 4.80 59.72 17.69 3.10 3.66 11.03 100
Original 1.26 5.53 85.02 1.63 1.98 4.58 100
Peach 1.77 5.69 10.47 28.57 30.98 22.52 100
Raspberry 1.34 4.56 8.00 20.61 46.50 18.98 100
strawberry 5.94 8.90 12.5 8.88 12.71 51.07 100
Total 4.2 14.48 47.13 6.99 10.81 16.39 100
Table 2.6. 
Singles
Flavour
Transition matrix flavour (singles) 
multifruit orange original peach raspberry strawberry Total
Multifruit 49.35 13.87 11.94 2.26 2.58 20.00 100
Orange 4.84 69.31 14.42 2.42 2.03 6.97 100
Original 1.19 4.31 87.78 1.40 1.83 3.49 100
Peach 2.90 5.31 13.77 33.57 29.71 14.73 100
Raspberry 1.63 3.42 7.17 20.85 54.23 12.70 100
strawberry 8.39 9.25 13.51 9.82 11.10 47.94 100
Total 4.99 15.59 52.20 6.39 9.61 11.21 100
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Table 2.7: Transition matrix product (all) 
all 1
product 1 multifruit Orange
danone
original light strawberry peach
muller
raspberry strawberry
yakult
original light Total
multifruit 41.84 17.11 5.08 6.22 17.52 3.21 3.84 2.80 1.56 0.83 100
a>c orange 4.80 59.72 7.96 4.89 9.30 3.10 3.66 1.73 4.11 0.73 100oc
-§ original 1.69
8.18 56.39 19.31 4.85 1.83 2.01 1.25 4.04 0.44 100
light 1.76 5.87 17.18 62.14 4.51 1.55 2.28 1.18 2.57 0.96 100
strawberry 8.98 13.78 6.39 6.84 50.05 2.16 4.03 4.39 2.68 0.70 100
peach 1.77 5.69 3.63 2.95 4.13 28.57 30.98 18.40 3.33 0.56 100
3
E raspberry 1.34 4.56 2.45 2.45 3.52 20.61 46.50 15.46 2.45 0.66 100
strawberry 1.79 2.22 2.46 1.91 6.07 18.08 24.58 40.41 1.69 0.80 100
3 original 0.52 3.77 3.92 2.44 1.79 1.58 1.83 0.93 78.50 4.72 100
(0
light 0.95 2.37 1.51 3.03 1.80 1.37 1.51 1.14 14.81 71.51 100
Total 4.20 14.48 13.42 14.06 9.42 6.99 10.81 6.97 15.22 4.43 100
Table 2.8: Transiti 
singles
prodcode
on matrix product (singles)
danone
multifruit orange original light strawberry peach
muller 
raspberry strawberry
Yakult
original Light Total
multifruit 49.35 13.87 4.84 3.87 17.74 2.26 2.58 2.26 0.32 2.90 100
CDc orange 4.84 69.31 6.97 4.36 6.00 2.42 2.03 0.97 2.42 0.68 100ocCO-0 original 1.11 7.10 53.66 23.17 2.77 2.88 2.33 1.44 4.77 0.78 100
light 1.77 4.30 15.18 67.62 2.45 1.43 2.11 1.18 2.78 1.18 100
strawberry 11.46 14.32 5.97 6.21 49.64 2.39 2.63 3.58 0.95 2.86 100
a> peach 2.90 5.31 5.80 6.04 2.42 33.57 29.71 2.32 1.93 0.00 100
3
E raspberry 1.63 3.42 2.28 3.75 1.79 20.85 54.23 0.91 0.81 0.33 100
strawberry 3.87 1.76 3.87 1.76 5.28 20.77 23.59 4.86 1.41 2.82 100
3 original 0.38 2.17 5.09 2.64 1.04 0.38 1.04 0.47 82.38 4.43 100
(0
light 2.08 3.47 3.47 3.82 6.25 0.35 2.08 1.74 12.85 63.89 100
Total 4.99 15.59 13.65 18.22 6.82 6.39 9.61 4.39 15.88 4.45 100
Table 2.9: Coefficients from a multinomial logit model with only product reinforcement
All danone muller yakult
multifruit orange original original light strawberry peach rasberry strawberry yakult light
multifruit 0.8510* 0.4674** 0.2496 0.3368* 0.4471** 0.4448 0.3378 0.4484 0.3147
(0.449) (0.144) (0.152) (0.182) (0.152) (0.448) (0.256) (0.254) (0.187)
orange 0.1013** 0.1537 0.0121 0.0357 0.0873** 0.0331 0.0375 0.0129 0.0142
(0.033) (0.323) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034)
co original 0.0162 -0.0114 0.1269** 0.0698** -0.0146 -0.0223 -0.0389 -0.0299 -0.0422c
"O (0.031) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.029) (0.041)
original light 0.1715 0.0554 0.2067** 0.2971** 0.1546** 0.1015* 0.1142* 0.0878 0.0888
(0.152) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.051) (0.055)
strawberry 0.2345** 0.1132** 0.0468 0.1071 0.3672** 0.0291 0.0785 0.1539** 0.0759
(0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061) (0.069) (0.064) (0.061) (0.083)
peach 0.3273** 0.2299 0.1227 0.1363 0.3024 0.5164** 0.3674** 0.4007** -0.0487
(0.088) (0.871) (0.092) (0.089) (0.486) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087) (0.119)
o rasberry 0.1307 0.0696 -0.0151 -0.0128 0.1012 0.1998** 0.2923* 0.1967** 0.00513
E (0.146) (0.044) (0.090) (0.071) (0.065) (0.043) (0.163) (0.042) (0.071)
strawberry 0.3921* 0.1260 0.2303 0.2242* 0.4644** 0.4532** 0.4668** 0.6459** 0.0476
(0.226) (0.152) (0.140) (0.128) (0.124) (0.126) (0.125) (0.125) (0.158)
yakult -0.1593** -0.1831** -0.1511** -0.1594** -0.1619** -0.1731** -0.1816** -0.1722** -0.0608**
"5 (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.071) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.009)
(0> yakult light -0.2301** -0.2348** -0.3407** -0.0632 -0.1751* -0.0573 -0.0929* -0.0627 0.1557**
(0.086) (0.059) (0.092) (0.068) (0.099) (0.049) (0.054) (0.049) (0.048)
const. -1.8788** 0.0785 -0.0848 -0.3692** -0.8221** -0.9333** -0.5857** -1.0210** 1.3371**
(0.116) (0.105) (0.112) (0.113) (0.109) (0.112) (0.103) (0.105) (0.161)
R2 0.2261
Obs. 50082
baseoutcome: yakult original
Standard Errors are reported in brackets and clustered on the household level 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
Table 2.10: Coefficients from a multinomial logit model with product and characteristic reinforcement
All
multifruit orange
danone
original original light strawberry peach
muller
rasberry strawberry
yakult 
yakult light
multifruit 0.2995** 0.1535** 0.0695 0.1117* 0.1306** 0.1684** 0.1206* 0.1677** 0.1318*
(0.061) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.064) (0.062) (0.066) (0.065) (0.074)
orange 0.0753** 0.0034** 0.0492** 0.0388 0.0492** -0.0375 -0.0295 -0.0501** -0.0185
(0.020) (0.001) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
co original 0.1172** 0.0666** 0.0201** 0.0331 0.1015** -0.0570 -0.0630** -0.0625** -0.0585cCOTJ (0.027) (0.025) (0.003) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)
original light 0.1016** 0.5249** 0.1382** 0.1190** 0.0935** 0.6431** 0.0809** 0.0612** -0.0052
(0.036) (0.031) (0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.037)
strawberry -0.0665 -0.0349 -0.0882* -0.0516 0.0325** -0.1081** -0.0785 -0.0881* 0.0009
(0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.004) (0.048) (0.046) (0.045) (0.055)
peach 0.0500 0.0570 0.0148 0.0270 0.0517 0.1149** 0.0499 0.0502 -0.0248
(0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.044) (0.427) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.056)
aj rasberry -0.0483* -0.2306** -0.0542 -0.0475 -0.0489* -0.0434* 0.1245** 0.0518* 0.0021
E (0.026) (0.029) (0.039) (0.035) (0.027) (0.026) 0.003) (0.026) (0.042)
strawberry 0.1157* 0.0225 0.1126 0.0968 0.1165* 0.1373** 0.1389** 0.2169** 0.0229
(0.065) (0.076) (0.071) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.086)
yakult -0.0478* -0.0459** -0.0054 -0.0586** -0.0517* -0.0968** -0.0849** -0.0973** -0.0551**
"5 (0.027) (0.019) (0.028) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
CO>, yakult light -0.0551 -0.0454 -0.7566** -0.0377 -0.0392 0.0162 -0.0055 0.0180 0.0837**
(0.046) (0.031) (0.048) (0.036) (0.051) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.034)
const. -1.8769** 0.0588 -0.0947 -0.3692 -0.8426 -0.8382** -0.4448** -1.0201** -1.3209**
(0.115) (0.104) (0.111) (0.112) (0.108) (0.102) (0.102) (0.106) (0.159)
R2 0.3028
Obs. 50082
baseoutcome: yakult original
Standard Errors are reported in brackets and clustered on the household level 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
Table 2.11: Coefficients from a multinomial logit model with product and characteristic reinforcement & price parameters
All danone muller yakult
multifruit orange original original light strawberry peach rasberry strawberry yakult light
multifruit 0.1702** 0.0399 0.0447 -0.0048 0.0126 0.0435 -0.0052 0.0386 0.0931*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.056) (0.061) (0.061) (0.053)
orange 0.0331* 0.0363** 0.0112 -0.0019 -0.0111 0.0019 0.0142 -0.0022 -0.0085
CD (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Coc original 0.0814** 0.0344 0.0549** 0.0002 0.0655** -0.0195 -0.0237 -0.0295 -0.0524(0Q (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032)
original light 0.0912** 0.0485** 0.1317** 0.1192** 0.0806** 0.0649* 0.0796** 0.0697** -0.0034
(0.034) (0.021) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
strawberry -0.0339 -0.0278 -0.0770* -0.0410 0.0611** -0.0752* -0.0530 -0.0651* 0.1000**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.025) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041)
peach 0.0720* 0.0726* 0.0358 0.0496 0.0676 0.1432** 0.0737* 0.0749 -0.0162
(0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.048)
<5
" 3
rasberry -0.0273 -0.0180 -0.0379 -0.0334 -0.0289 -0.0331 0.0234** -0.0415* 0.0072
E (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.038) (0.024) (0.025) (0.011) (0.024) (0.032)
strawberry 0.0104 -0.0318 0.0460 0.0301 0.0201 0.0327 0.0403 0.1207** 0.0117
(0.045) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.044) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.061)
yakult -0.0478* -0.0246 0.0072 -0.0390* -0.0319 -0.0699** -0.0594** -0.0663** -0.0548**
3 (0.027) (0.019) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
03> yakult light -0.0551 -0.0548 -0.1592** -0.0535 -0.0411 0.0012 -0.0154 -0.0028 0.0823**
(0.046) (0.033) (0.046) (0.037) (0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
UP own -0.4536** -0.4571** -0.4389** -0.4370** -0.4668** -0.7561** -0.7318** -0.7643** -0.0211
CD
O (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.016)
Q . UP other 0.1981** 0.0679** 0.0943** 0.0932** 0.0918** 0.0504** 0.0727** 0.0811** 0.0182
(0.015) (0.001) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015)
const. 7.7466** 13.7851** 12.3685** 12.0741** 12.5733** 20.9294** 20.0975** 19.8650** -1.0034
(1.243) (1.317) (1.299) (1.231) (1.261) (1.337) (1.324) (1.363) (0.705)
R2 0.4134
Obs. 50082
baseoutcom e: yakult original
Standard Errors are reported in brackets and clustered on the household level
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
Table 2.12a: Coefficients from a multinomial logit model with product and characteristic reinforcement & price parameters & household characteristics
R2
Obs.
0.4155
50082
all
multifruit orange
danone 
original original light strawberry peach
muller
rasberry strawberry
yakult 
yakult light
multifruit 0.1723** 0.0419 -0.0436 -0.0026 0.1596** 0.0398 -0.0040 0.0394 0.0964*
(0.051) (0.049) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.056) (0.062) (0.061) (0.052)
orange 0.0322* 0.0368** -0.0116 -0.0016 -0.0101 0.0038 0.0164 -0.0001 -0.0091
a> (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)co original 0.0812** -0.0344 0.0534** -0.0014 0.0641** -0.0169 -0.0205 -0.0253 -0.0522c
-§ (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.032)
original light 0.0911** 0.0491 0.1319** 0.1190** 0.0801** 0.0668 0.0789** 0.0690“ -0.0046
(0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
strawberry -0.0356 -0.0297 -0.0751* -0.0397 0.0581** -0.0773 -0.0572 -0.0691 0.0086
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.025) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041)
peach 0.0709* 0.0698 0.0304 0.0454 0.0684* 0.1426 0.0740* 0.0762* -0.0165
(0.039) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.048)
rasberry -0.0276 -0.0178 -0.0328 -0.0303 -0.0297 -0.0329 0.0225** 0.0426* 0.0076"3
E (0.022) (0.029) (0.033) (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) 0.002) (0.026) (0.031)
strawberry 0.0104 -0.0307 0.0440 0.0285 0.0189 0.0328 0.0402 0.1199“ 0.0121
(0.044) (0.076) (0.051) (0.052) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.059)
yakult -0.0261 -0.0233 0.0078 -0.0387 -0.0325 -0.0681 -0.0600** -0.0678** -0.0556**
3 (0.025) (0.019) (0.027) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
(0>* yakult light -0.0595 -0.0568 -0.1606** -0.0536 -0.0407 -0.0027 -0.0153 -0.0022 0.0835“
(0.042) (0.033) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
UP own -0.4573** -0.4615** -0.4450** -0.4420** -0.4683** -0.7609** -0.7355** -0.7677“ -0.0209
oo (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.016)'CQ. UP other 0.1980** 0.0677** 0.0933** 0.0919** 0.0929** 0.0511** 0.0751** 0.0849** 0.0179
(0.015) (0.001) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015)
> TV 0.0042 0.0048 0.0012 -0.0034 0.0019 0.0181** 0.0130** 0.0164“ -0.0060F- (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ageMS -0.0002 0.0036 0.0111** 0.0080* -0.0068 -0.0046** -0.0104** -0.0163“ -0.0020
o
E (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
0"O sexMS -0.2161 -0.1985 -0.1875 -0.3883** -0.2811* -0.2730 -0.3262 -0.1768 -0.1152“
(0.180) (0.157) (0.156) (0.159) (0.168) (0.175) (0.181) (0.188) (0.017)
const. 8.0716** 13.9998** 12.2549** 12.4118** 13.2197** 21.2554** 20.7609“ 20.5040** -0.6811
(1.273) (1.345) (1.333) (1.267) (1.295) (1.385) (1.375) (1.417) (0.776)
CN
CO
baseoutcom e: yakult original
Standard Errors are reported in brackets and clustered on the household level, * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level
Table 2.12b: Coefficients from a multinomial logit model only price parameters & household characteristics
All danone muller yakult
multifruit orange original original light strawberry peach rasberry strawberry yakult light
UP own -0.5190** -0.5143** -0.4859** -0.4806** -0.5240** -0.8246** -0.8040** -0.8369** -0.0272*
<Do (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.016)
L_Q. UP other 0.2373** 0.0671** 0.0768** 0.0840** 0.1415** 0.0945** 0.0965** 0.1393** 0.0308*
(0.013) (0.001) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
&
TV 0.0173* 0.0068 0.0027 -0.0053 0.0076 0.0209** 0.0139 0.0179* -0.0040
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
ageMS -0.0085 -0.0021 0.0080 0.0078 -0.0209** -0.0123* -0.0208** -0.0272** 0.0012
o
E (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)<0TD sexMS 0.0272 0.1866 -0.1460 -0.3032 -0.0504 -0.0161 -0.2597 0.0816 -0.3437
(0.244) (0.245) (0.241) (0.255) (0.236) (0.280) (0.266) (0.274) (0.296)
const. 8.9529** 15.1821** 13.8906** 13.8661** 13.9039** 21.8812** 22.6742** 21.2910** -0.8637
(1.377) (1.425) (1.513) (1.454) (1.402) (1.758) (1.546) (1.622) (0.992)
R2 0.2055
Obs. 50082
Table 2.13: Coefficients from the full multinomial logit model (TableH) for singles
Singles danone muller yakult
multifruit orange original original light strawberry peach rasberry strawberry yakult light
multifruit 0.3324** 0.1737 0.1649 0.1252 0.0966 0.2166 0.1291 0.0735** 0.2585
(0.161) (0.167) (0.169) (0.171) (0.198) (0.169) (0.178) (0.199) (0.174)
orange 0.1257* 0.1921** 0.1261* 0.1403** 0.1825** 0.1549** 0.1751** 0.1768** 0.0661
<1) (0.063) (0.059) (0.065) (0.058) (0.067) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.059)Co original ^0.0556 -0.0236 0.0592** 0.0341 -0.1167 -0.0212 -0.0136 0.0001 -0.1112c(0"O (0.099) (0.073) (0.023) (0.062) (0.088) (0.085) (0.101) (0.086) (0.081)
original light 0.0702 0.0271 0.1415** 0.1370** 0.1108* 0.0904 0.0605 0.0542 -0.0301
(0.062) (0.058) (0.056) (0.047) (0.059) (0.064) (0.066) (0.058) (0.057)
strawberry -0.5183** -0.4526** -0.5791** -0.5317** 0.3747** -0.5694** -0.4776** -0.4617** -0.1756
(0.155) (0.145) (0.151) (0.140) (0.155) (0.159) (0.157) (0.161) (0.157)
peach -0.2040** -0.2093** -0.3338** -0.2356** -0.1755** 0.1298** 0.1937** 0.1941** -0.0473
(0.086) (0.088) (0.097) (0.098) (0.085) (0.063) (0.093) (0.092) (0.095)
0 rasberry -0.2582** -0.2201** -0.2077** -0.2085** -0.2353** 0.2784** 0.1779** 0.2447** -0.15293
E (0.073) (0.075) (0.077) (0.081) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.091)
strawberry 0.8749** 0.7634** 0.9504** 0.8623** 0.8566** 0.8977** 0.8213** 0.9285** 0.3648
(0.290) (0.288) (0.289) (0.291) (0.292) (0.293) (0.294) (0294) (0.313)
yakult -0.1551** -0.1435** -0.0964** -0.1429** -0.1444** -0.1581** -0.1736** -0.1801** -0.1459**
"5j* (0.038) (0.049) (0.042) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.041)
>% yakult light 0.0938 0.0898 -0.0742 0.0173** 0.1137 0.0851 0.1262* 0.1341* 0.2411**
(0.063) (0.079) (0.078) (0.064) (0.070) (0.075) (0.068) (0.069) (0.078)
UP own -0.3570** 0.3694** -0.3218** -0.3427** -0.3862** -0.6783** -0.6562** -0.6482** 0.0214
0o (0.052) (0.050) (0.057) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) (0.033)■i_Q. UP other 0.1971** 0.0916** 0.0799** 0.0881** 0.1080** 0.0738* 0.1084** 0.1794** 0.0353
(0.039) (0.003) (0.036) (0.031) (0.037) (0.041) (0.038) (0.044) (0.030)
e
TV -0.0133 0.0010 -0.0143 -0.0228* 0.0221 -0.0022 -0.0145 0.0061 -0.0125
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
ageMS -0.0067 -0.0002 0.0038 -0.0046** -0.0153 -0.0003 -0.0120 -0.0079 -0.0243**
o
E (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
0■a sexMS -0.1185 -0.3213 -0.3513 -0.8184** 0.2545 -0.2453 -0.5864 -0.0394 -1.0310**
(0.384) (0.341) (0.348) (0.346) (0.424) (0.398) (0.406) (0.422) (0.407)
const. 4.9768** 10.3484** 9.1920** 10.8635** 8.4325** 17.5973** 17.7213** 12.8095** h0.7547
(2.247) (2.048) (2.333) (2.121) J2.331) (2.303) (2.339) (2.455) (T631)
R2
Obs.
.4461
6767!
baseoutcom e: yakult original
Standard Errors are reported in brackets and clustered on the household level, * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level, * *  statistically significant at the 5 percent level
CHAPTER 2. LEARNING TO CONSUME
Figure 2.1: Household purchases across products and characteristics
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Figure 2.2: Unitprice kernel densities by litre and by pack
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Figure 2.3: Unitprice kernel densities by pack & by fatcontent/brand
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m u l t i f r u i t -------------orange
original -------------  peach
raspberry -------------  strawberry
Other/Comershop -----------  Discounter
-----------  Morrison/Safeway -----------  Sainsbury
-----------Tesco -----------  Waitrose
Figure 2.4: Unitprice kernel densities by pack & by flavour/storetype
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Figure 2.6: Unitprices over time by storetype
average unitprice per pack (£)by storetype over time
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Figure 2.5: Unitprices over time by brand/flavour
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CHAPTER 2. LEARNING TO CONSUME
Figure 2.7: Typical switching patterns
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Figure 2.8: Product/Brand/Flavour switching over time
CO
CM
purchase occasion s
Product s w itc h in g  Brand switching
Flavour switching
37
CHAPTER 2. LEARNING TO CONSUME
Figure 2.9: Impact o f  a 10% increase in own product/brand purchases
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Figure 2.10: Impact o f  a 10% increase in own/competitor prices
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Figure 2.11: Impact o f a 10% increase in TVexposure/age/% male shopper
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(Differences in the marginal effect after a 10% increase in TVexposure/age/%male shopper)
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Aggregate information cascades
3.1 Introduction
A central agency in health policy must decide how to disclose information on the adoption 
of a new treatment. One possibility is to inform the doctors on how many others have 
already decided to adopt the new treatment. Another is to inform them on how many have 
considered doing it but have judged that it is preferable to stick to the old practice. Another 
possibility is to reveal both, the number of doctors in favor of the new practice and the 
number of physicians in favor of the old one. Can the way the information is disclosed make 
a difference for the diffusion of the new treatment? Suppose the agency is uncertain on the 
effects of the new treatment and considers as the worst case scenario the situation in which 
the new treatment is widely adopted while ultimately resulting in worse health outcomes 
than the old one, for instance because of side effects. Which disclosure policy should the 
agency employ?
Intuitively, one would think that the disclosure of all available information should max­
imize social welfare. However, this only hold if there are no externalities and a doctor’s 
decision about a treatment for a patient is obviously a case with huge externalities. While 
the life of a patient may matter a lot to the physician it surely matters more to the patient,
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at least in most cases.
Bickchandani et al. have argued in their seminal paper on information cascades that 
the adoption of medical procedures is often based on fairly weak information and that in 
many cases doctors tend to imitate others. As an example they cite the widespread use of 
tonsillectomies in the sixties and seventies and argue that it was essentially an information 
cascade (where the shere the fact that the majority of physiscians employed the procedure 
overrode any private information individual doctors might have had access to). And in this 
case it was a “down cascade”—a cascade that generated the worst outcome since it eventually 
turned out that tonsillectomies did more harm than good.
One of the questions we raise in this paper is whether a central agency that can influence 
the transmission information may want to decide to withhold some information. And indeed 
it turns out that this might be the case. This is due to the following simple result: If agents 
have access to information about both, how many have others adopted and how many have 
not, both types of cascades are possible—cascades where everybody adopts and cascades 
where everybody does not adopt. (This is, of course, what we know from the literature 
already.) However, if the agency decides only to inform about how many have adopted 
then there is only one type of cascade—one where evrybody adopts. And if the agency only 
reports about those who have decided not to adopt, there is also only one type of cascade, 
one where everybody decides not to adopt. Thus, if the really bad outcome is the one where 
everybody herds on the new treatment while the new treatment is, in fact, worse than the 
old, the agency can avoid that this happens—by withholding the information about how 
many others so far have decided to adopt.
While information about medical procedures appears to be a particularly appealing 
policy-relevant example for the theory we develop here, there are, in fact, many other ap­
plications. At the core of our paper is simply a model of social learning where agents have 
to make binary decisions, like adopting a new treatment or not, making an investment or 
not. Our crucial assumption (where we deviate from the previous literature) is that when an
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agent makes his decision, he can only observe the total number of others who have already 
taken one of the two available actions, for example, the total number of others who have 
already decided to adopt the new treatment while he cannot observe the number of those 
who have previously contempleted the choice but opted otherwise.
This structure appears very natural for many examples that have previously been dis­
cussed in the literature on social learning. A restaurant goer who must decide whether or not 
he wants dinner at a particular restaurant he stands in fron of, may be able to peer through 
the window to see how many others decide to have dinner there but he can only speculate 
about how many others tood before the door and decided to pass. A similar example is 
that of a manager of a venture capital firm who discusses a project with an inventor who 
needs capital to develop a new product. Say, the inventor has already secured funds from 
two other venture capital firms. Then we may expect that the inventor gladly mentions 
this to the manager with whom he negotiates. The manager who will have some private 
information about the viablity of the project will, of course, also extract some information 
from knowing that there were two others who obviously had information telling them that 
the project is good. On the other hand, since we can safely assume that the inventor will 
not tell the manager about how often he was turned down, the manager can only guess how 
many other firms had information telling them that the project was bad. Of course, knowing 
the number of venture capital firms that would, in principle, finance such a project will help 
him to update his beliefs about this.
In all these examples agents who have to decide between two options have only aggregate 
information about one of the two options while in all models present in the literature so far, a 
decision maker has access to information about the individual choices of others who decided 
before him. The standard model of social learning (Banerjee, 1992, and Bikhchandani et 
al., 1992), for instance, contemplates a sequence of binary decisions which are all observable. 
Agent n knows whether each predecessor in the sequence, from agent 1 to agent n —1, decided 
in favor of one option or the other. We find that our set up captures quite naturally some
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situations frequenlty arising in social interactions. Like in the case of the restaurant goer or 
the venture capital firm in many circumstances, a decision maker can gather some aggregate 
information (how many agents have already adopted, invested, chosen a restaurant), but he 
can rarely observe all the individual decisions. Clearly, if the decision is binary, knowing 
the number of agents who have made a certain decision helps to update on the number of 
agents who have already made the opposite decision. But this is not equivalent to knowing 
it. And we can show that it makes an important difference. In particular, we can show, as 
we have mentioned already above, that with aggregate information there can only be one 
type of information cascade.
An information cascade occurs when agents rationally neglect their own private infor­
mation, i.e., when they choose the same action independently of the signal they recieve (for 
instance following their predecessors). In the standard sequential model of Banerjee (1992) 
and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) different types of cascades can arise. If the decision is binary, 
say, between investing and not, there can be cascades where, from a certain point onwards, 
all decision makers decide to invest, as well as cascades where, from a certain point onwards, 
all decisions makers decide not to invest At a first glance, one could think that this is the 
case in our set up, too. If a restaurant goer sees many people in a restaurant, he could 
cascade and join the crowd; if he sees the restaurant empty, he could cascade and decide 
to pass on the restaurant too. However, we can prove that, on the contrary, only the first 
cascade is possible. In equilibrium it cannot be that there is a cascade on the unobservable 
action, e.g., that the restaurant remains empty altough some people have read good reviews 
on it.
In many cases, one of the available actions arises naturally as the observable action. In one 
of the examples above it is the number of investment decisions (as opposed to the number 
of declined investments). In another it is the number of decisions to dine in a particular 
restaurant (as opposed to the number of passes). There are, however, important cases where 
third parties may have the power to decide what kind of information is provided to agents.
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This is the case from which we started: the disclosure policy of a health agency. The worst 
case scenario for the agency is that in which agents start to herd on the wrong action. This 
induces the biggest welfare loss. The central agency may not know what the wrong action 
is (if it did, it could simply announce it) but often the welfare losses will be asymmetric: the 
case where the new treatment is indeed more effective but everybody sticks to the old one 
may be better or worse than the opposite case, where the old treatment is more effective but 
everybody switches to the new. Since the central agency can choose which action to make 
observable, it can rule out one of the two erroneous cascades—by withholding information. 
In summary, we like to argue that the aggregate information set up that we introduce here 
has not only several intriguing properties—some of which in stark contrast to the predictions 
of the standard model—it also has a potenatially important policy implications.
We extend the literature on social learning not only theoretically but also experimentally. 
After establishing our theoretical results, we have also implemented our set up in a laboratory 
experiment. The aim of this experiment is to have a first “reality check,” since we believe 
that a theory like ours is more appealing if it is not completely off the mark. Previous models 
of social learning, starting with the standard sequential model with all observable actions, 
have been extensively tested in the laboratory, with results that are sometimes positive and 
sometimes less favorable. We find that our theory finds support in the laboratory, although 
some interesting anomalies emerge.
Two papers close in spirit to ours are Celen and Kariv (2004 and 2005). Similarly to our 
approach, Celen and Kariv are interested in understanding what happens when we remove 
the strong assumption that agents can observe the entire history of individual decisions. 
Celen and Kariv (2004) extend the standard model of sequential social learning by allowing 
each agent to observe the decision of his immediate predecessor only. Celen and Kariv (2005) 
test this model in the laboratory. The theoretical predicion of these authors is that, when 
each agent can only observe his immediate predecessor’s decision, behavior does not settle 
on a single action. Long periods of herding can be oserved, but switches to the other action
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occur. As time passes, the periods of herding become loger and longer, and the switches 
more and more rare. However, their predictions find limited support in the laboratory.
Our model, in contrast, does fairly well in the laboratory. In just two simple treatments 
we find that the main comparative statics go all in the right directions. Moreover, most of 
the deviations we observe pretty much mirror those that have dosumented in the previous 
experimental literature on standard cascade models. There is, however, one interesting 
anomaly that deserves to be mentioned here. With a fifty-fifty prior we find some “reluctance 
to go first.” Agents who observe the empty restaurant but have a good signal (and who should 
therefore decide to enter the restaurant) do so in only 56% of all cases. We conjecture that 
this reluctance to go first may stem from the fact that in many other environments, in 
particular in those with endogenous seqeuncing, one would indeed prefer others to do the 
first costly experiment. We also conjecture that this behavioural effect mirrors the non- 
triviality of our theoretical result.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the formal 
model. We present its equilibrium analysis in Section 3 and Section 4 contains an example. 
Section 5 describes the experiment and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The M odel
In our economy there are n agents who have to decide in sequence whether or not to take up 
a certain option. For convencience, we shall refer to this choice as the decision on whether 
or not to invest. Time is discrete and indexed by t =  1 , 2 , n. Each agent makes his choice 
only once in the sequence. Agent Vs (i =  1,2,..., n) action space is given by {0,1}, where 1 
is interpreted as investment. Player Vs action is denoted by Ii G {0,1}. An agent’s payoff 7r* 
depends on his choice and on the true state of the world u  G {0,1}. The prior probability of 
cj =  1 is r G (0,1). If u; =  1 agent i receives a payoff of 1 if he choses to invest, and a payoff
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of zero otherwise; vice versa if u =  0. That is,
7Ti =  u l i  +  (1 -  u ;)( l -  I i ) .
The sequence in which agents make their choices is randomly determined before the first 
agent makes a decision, and agents are, w.l.o.g., (re-)numbered according to their positions: 
agent i chooses at time i only. All sequences are equally likely. The agents, however, are 
not informed about which sequence has been chosen. Furthermore, they do not know their 
own position in the sequence. When called upon, agent i is only informed about the total 
number of agents before him who have decided to invest. In other words, the decision to 
invest is assumed to be the only observable action. This means that, while the aggregate 
number of investments is observable, each individual decision to invest or not is not publicly 
known. We denote the total number of agents who have invested before agent i b y  Ti, i.e., 
agent i is informed about Ti =  addition to observing Ti, each agent i receives a
private signal cq E {0,1} that is correlated with the true state u j . In particular, we assume 
that each agent receives a symmetric binary signal distributed as follows:
Pr(cq =  1 | u j  =  1) =  Pr(crj =  0 | u j  =  0) =  q.
Note that, conditional on the state of the world, the signals are i.i.d.. We shall refer to 
u j  =  1 as the “good state” and to u j  =  0 as the “bad state.” A signal pointing in the direction 
of the good state (<7 ; =  1 ) shall be called “good signal” and a signal pointing in the opposite 
direction (<7 * =  0) “bad signal.” We assume that 1 > q > r and that r +  q > 1. These 
conditions ensure that, in the one-agent case, an agent would invest after a good signal and 
would not invest after a bad signal, which renders the problem interesting. Note that these 
two conditions also imply that q >  25 i-e-? that the signal respects the monotone likelihood 
ratio property. Finally, the signal is not perfectly informative, which makes social learning
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possible and relevant.
Agent i ’s information set is, therefore, represented by the couple ( T i ,  cq). An agent’s 
strategy 3 i  maps ( T i ,  d i )  into an action, i.e.,
3i : {0 , 1 , 2 ,..., n — 1 } x {0 , 1 } —> {0 , 1 } .
An agent’s mixed strategy induces, for each (T*,^), a probability with which the agent 
invests. We denote the probability with which agent i invests after observing (T i , O i ) by
l i ( T i , O i ) .
To conclude the description of our model, it is useful to introduce the notion of an 
aggregate information cascade. The definition is virtually identical to the standard definition 
of information cascade, with the characteristic that histories are summarized by the aggregate 
statistic T i .
Definition 1 An aggregate information cascade (AIC) occurs when, along the equilibrium 
path, there is a decision after which all agents choose an action independently of their signal. 
In particular:
In an aggregate up cascade (AUC) there is a critical trigger value T u p  such that if 
Tfc =  T u p  all agents from k onwards choose to invest regardless of their private signals. 
Consequently, there is some k such that Tk+j =  Tk +  j  for all j  =  1,..., n — k.
In an aggregate down cascade (ADC) there is a critical trigger value T D O W N  such that 
if Tfc =  Tdown all agents from k onwards choose not to invest regardless of their private 
signals. Consequently, in an ADC there is some k such that Tk+j =  Tk for all j  =  1,..., n — k.
We axe now ready to start analysing the equilibrium decisions in our economy.
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5T3 Equilibrium A nalysis
The ultimate goal of our analysis is to understand the social learning process that occurs 
in our economy. Each agent can learn about the true state of the world from the aggregate 
information that he receives about other agents’ choices. This can lead to better decisions. 
On the other hand, it may be that also in our economy, as in the canonical model of social 
learning of Banerjee (1992) and Bickchandani et al. (1992), there is room for information 
cascades, i.e., for situations in which agents take the same decision independently of their 
private information. In such a case, the process of information aggregation will not be 
efficient. We will show that, indeed, “up cascades” of investments are possible even in our 
set up, as they are in the canonical model. In contast, “down cascades” of non-investments 
never occur in equilibrium.
We restrict the entire analysis to symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. Our economy is 
represented by a symmetric game and there is nothing in the environment that could help 
agents to coordinate on an asymmetric outcome. Therefore, the restriction to symmetric 
equilibira is very natural.
To start our analysis, it is convenient to focus first on the case of Ti =  0, in which an 
agent observes that no one has invested before him. At a first glance, the decision problem 
in such a situation appears to be fairly complicated. If the agent knew that Ti — 0 simply 
because he is the first decision maker, then he should certainly follow his private signal, since 
that is the only information available. If, instead, he knew that he is not the first decision 
maker, then he may decide to ignore the signal and not invest independently of it, as other 
agents have already chosen the non-investment option. Intuitively, one might think that 
Ti =  0 is pretty bad information if there are many players. Suppose that n is very large and 
you observe that nobody has invested before you. But at the same time you own private 
signal is good. Would you trust your own signal? Of course, this will depend on the other 
agents’ strategy choices. While the problem is made hard due to the fact that the agent does
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not know his position in the sequence it is made easier due to the fact that the only thing 
that matters about other agents’ strategies is what these specify for the very same case of 
T =  0.
To attack the problem, let us start with the following definition:
Definition 2 An initially-pure equilibrium (IPE) is a Nash equilibrium that prescribes pure 
actions for Ti =  0  and both possible signal realizations cq =  0  and cq =  1 .
Note that there can be mixing in an IPE after observing Ti >  0. The definition of an 
IPE just excludes the cases in which an agent mixes after observing Ti — 0. We are able to 
establish some results that focus on T* =  0. First, we prove that in any IPE agents must 
follow their signals after observing Ti — 0: there cannot exist IPEs in which an agent plays 
independently of his signal or play against it.
Lemma 3 In any IPE, an agent follows his own signal if he observes that nobody has in­
vested so far, i.e., Z*(0 , <7j) =  <7* for all i.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that for T{ — 0 agents choose either 
to invest always or never (independently of the private signal). Consider the latter 
possibility first, i.e., consider a pure-strategy equilibrium with Z*(0,0) =  Zj(0,1) =  0. 
Then, along the equilibrium path, nobody ever invests and, for all agents j  =  1, ...,n, 
Tj =  0. Hence, Ti =  0 does not reveal any information on the true state of the world. 
Since the posterior probability that to =  1 is still r, agent i is better off by following 
his informative signal <7j. Next, consider the case of investment after Tj =  0, i.e., an 
equilibrium with Zj(0,0) =  Zj(0,1) =  1. In this case, along the equilibrium path, only 
the first agent in the sequence observes that nobody else has invested before. That 
is, Ti =  0 if and only if i =  1. Hence, after observing T, =  0 agent i knows that he 
is the first agent in the sequence and, thus, should follow his signal. Finally, suppose 
that for Ti =  0 agents choose to play against their private information, i.e., consider a
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pure-strategy equilibrium with 2i(0, cq) =  1 — cr*. Then, along the equilibrium path, 
after observing T; =  0 , agent i knows that he is either the first in the sequence or other 
agents before him have received the good signal. In both cases, he should follow his 
signal. ■
While we have shown that in any IPE an agent who observes zero investments should 
follow his signal, it remains unclear whether such equilibria exist. The next lemma identifies
a necessary and sufficient condition under which an IPE does indeed exist.
Lemma 4 An IPE exists if and only if r >  2_i^ Zqyl_qn •
Proof. We first prove that it is indeed optimal for an agent i to follow his own signal
after 7* =  0  provided that everybody else does so and that the condition stated in the 
lemma holds. (Notice that what another agent j  does for 7} > 0 is irrelevant for agent 
Vs optimal choice of Z;(0, ai).) Assuming such behaviour of others, an agent i who
observes 7^  =  0  and cq =  1 attaches to the good state a posterior of
Pr(u =  1 | Ti =  0, <Ti =  1) =
rgEJ=i(! -  g)i_1 + (1 -  r)(! -  g) E"=i g*"1 ’
He will follow his good signal if this posterior is at least 1/2, i.e., if
n n
r g B 1- ^ 1 > (1 —r)(l —
j =i j = i
Solving for the sums and rearranging the terms, we get the condition in the lemma. 
To complete the proof we have to show that an agent i who assumes that the others
play according to the rules stated in the lemma and who observes T{ =  0 and cq =  0
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does not invest, i.e., we need that
Pr(u; =  1 | Ti =  0, cr* =  0) =
 r(!-g) E"=i(1-g)J'~1_______
r ( i  -  q) E " = i( i  -  q)j ~ l +  ( i  -  r )qYTj=i qj ~l
i
r(x - q ) ~ q}J 1 < (1 ~ r)q'52qj
j = 1 .7=1
which can be written as
r q2 1 — qn
jt=7) K ( i - , ) * i - ( i - , r  (3-1}
Since r < g we also have yz; < y^ . Hence, inequality (3.1) holds if y^y^y^yr > 1.
This can be rewritten as 2q >  1 +  qn+1 — (1  — q)n+1 which is obviously true for q >  1 / 2 .
■
Notice that the condition imposed in the lemma is always fulfilled if r >  1/2, i.e., when 
the good state is initially more likely than the bad state, an IPE always exists.
We now turn our attention to Nash equilibria that are not initially pure. The next lemma 
trivially follows from Bayesian updating. We state it formally because we shall need it later 
on. The lemma after that shows that in an equilibrium that is not an IPE agents who observe 
T{ =  0  never invest if their signal is bad, but will invest with some positive probability if 
their signal is good.
Lemma 5 (i) In any equilibrium, Ii(Ti, 1) > Ii{Ti, 0) for all Ti, with the inequality being 
strict if li(T i,0) <  1. (%%) In any equilibrium, 0 < Ii(Ti,0) < 1 => J<(Ti, 1) =  1 and
0 < Ii(Ti, 1 ) < 1 =» Xi(Ti, 0) =  0 for all T*.
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Proof. In equilibrium, each agent will infer the same information from observing a par­
ticular value of T  ^ Whatever the posterior induced by just observing T;, it follows 
immediately from Bayes’ rule that an agent who has an additional good signal will 
be more optimistic about the good state than an agent with a bad signal. Hence, 
the first part follows. Note that the inequality is weak only when 2i(T*, 0) =  1. The 
first part of the proposition results from these considerations and from expected payoff 
maximization. The second part follows from the same argument and the additional 
observation that mixing requires indifference. ■
Lemma 6  In any equilibrium that is not an IPE, 2^(0,0) =  0 and 0 < 2j(0 ,1) < 1 for all i.
Proof. Given Lemma 5 we just need to rule out an equilibrium with 0 < Z*(0,0) < 1 and 
2 i(0 ,1) =  1. For an agent to be indifferent between investing and not after Ti — 0 
and Gi =  0 we need Pr(u> =  1 j Ti =  0, cq =  0) =  1/2. Using Bayes’ rule this can be 
re-written as
r  Pr(Ti =  0, Gi =  0 | u  =  1) =  (1 — r) Pr(T; =  0, =  0 | u =  0),
or
r ^ 2 ( \ - (i Y ( 1 - p Y  1 = C1 “ O X y t 1 ~ p Y \
j=i j=i
where p denotes the probability with which all other agents who see Ti =  0  and cr =  0  
invest. Rewriting this as
n
5 Z [W 1 ~  qY  - i 1 - r v )  (x ~  p )J_1] = 0
j= 1
makes it obvious that there is no p >  0  that solves the equation: since we have 
q >  max {I , rjthe left-hand side is strictly negative for any positive p. m
Having characterized equilibria that are not initially pure, we must discuss whether they
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exist. The next lemma introduces a necessary and sufficient condition for such mixed-strategy 
equilibria to exist.
Lemma 7 Mixed-strategy equilibria with 2^(0,0) =  0 and 0 < 2^(0,1) < 1 for all i exist if 
and only if there is a p £ (0,1) that solves
r{ 1 -  (1 -  pq)n\ =  (1 -  r) [1 -  (1 -  p( 1 -  g))n].
Proof. The lemma follows from observing that, if all other agents j  ^  i use 2(0,0) =  0 
and 2 (0 , 1 ) =  p  agent z’s indifference between investing and not investing after T; =  0  
and Gi =  1 requires Pr(u; =  1 | Ti =  0 ,cr =  1) =  1/2. After applying Bayes’ rule and 
some algebraic manipulation, this gives
n n
=  C1 ~ r )0- - P i 1
j =i j =l
which is equivalent to the equation in the lemma. ■
This lemma completes our characterization of equilibrium decisions after observing Ti =  
0. In the following proposition we summarize what we have learned so far.
Proposition 8 If r >  1/2 agents who observe Ti =  0 follow their signal in all equilibria.
V  2-(l-q)n-qn < T <  1 / 2  there is an equilibrium where agents who observe Ti =  0  follow 
their signal but there may also be other (mixed-strategy) equilibria where agents who observe 
Ti — 0  follow their signal if it is bad and mix if it is good.
If r ^ 2^[iE^r_qn there can only be equilibria where agents who observe Ti =  0  follow 
their signal if it is bad and mix if it is good}
1 Notice that the third part of the proposition touches on an existence problem. For obvious reasons we 
have restricted our analysis to symmetric Bayesian Nash—in case of bad priors these may fail to exist.
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Proof. The proposition follows immediately from the four lemmas and the observation 
that <  1 / 2 . ■
Our analysis essentially shows that, when facing a situation with no previous investments, 
an agent should either follow his signal or use a mixed strategy. An agent should never decide 
independently of his signal, neither should he decide against it. This clearly indicates that we 
should not observe a “down cascade” where all agent choose not to invest. In other words, a 
restaurant will not stay empty forever only because it is empty now. While this puts already 
a lot of structure on the equilibrium solution of our game, we still need to investigate what 
happens for different values of the aggregate investment T.
To this purpose, we establish in the next step an intuitive monotonicity result, according 
to which a higher value of T is always (weakly) good news: when an agent observes a higher 
number of investments made before him, he cannot be less willing to invest himself. Once 
this monotonicity lemma is established, we will be able to prove two fundamental results 
about aggregate cascades.
Lemma 9 In any equilibrium, T[ <  T" ==> Ti(Tf (Ti) < Ti(T", (Ti) for both cri =  0 and
Oi =  1 .
Proof. From the first part of Lemma 5 we get that prob(T* =  T' +  1 | u =  1 , T*_i =  T') >  
prob(T* =  T r +  1 | u j  =  0, Tj_i =  T'). Hence,
prob(Ti =  T  \u  =  1 )r 
prob(Ti =  T  | uj =  0)(1 — r)
is increasing in T, which gives, by Bayes’ rule,
prob(o; =  1 | T{ =  T") >  prob(u; =  1 | Ti =  T') T" >  T .
The statement in the lemma follows directly from that and expected payoff maximiza­
tion. ■
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The intuition for the lemma is as follows. Due to the first monotonicity result in Lemma 
5 we know that, for any given player, the transition from T to T +  1 is more likely in the 
good state than in the bad state. This is simply true because a good signal is more likely 
in the good state and a good signal makes an agent more likely to invest. Hence, for any 
expectations about your own position in the sequence the higher T the more likely it is that 
you are in the good state. In other words, the more people you see in the restaurant the 
more likely it is that it is a good restaurant.
We are now ready to state our two main propositions that characterize which forms of 
cascades will or will not arise. In particular, we will see that aggregate down cascades never 
arise, while aggregate up cascades are always part of an equilibrium.
Proposition 10 In any equilibrium, TiiTi, 1) > 0 for all Ti, i.e., an agent with a good signal 
always invests with positive probability and an ADC never occurs in equilibrium.
Proof. The proposition follows from Proposition 8  and Lemma 9. ■
There are no cascades on the unobservable action. Incidentally, we note that such a result 
just comes from an equilibrium argument. One could imagine that, when facing a “low” value 
of Ti, in order to make his decision, agent i should consider all possible sequences and attach 
a probability to the event that he is the first in the sequence, or the second, etc. After all, 
a low number of investments may merely come from the fact that only few agents had the 
opportunity to invest so far, in which case the low value of Ti should be considered “good” 
news. Or it could arise from many agents having the option of investing but few only using 
it, in which case the low Ti should be viewed as bad news. All this inference process could 
be quite complicated. Our analysis solves the problems by just invoking some equilibrium 
arguments.
The next proposition considers cascades on the observable action and it shows that AUCs 
do arise—and are, in fact, part of any equilibrium.
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Proposition 11 AUCs are part of any equilibrium. In particular, in any equilibriumTi(Ti, (Ti) =  
1 for all Ti >  | .
Proof. Consider an agent i who observes Ti >  |  and suppose he knew that he were the 
last agent in the sequence. Further suppose there were no AUC. Then, due to Lemma 
9, this agent knows that there were at least T i  good signals and no more than n — T i  — 1 
bad signals. Hence, even if this agent’s own signal is bad, he knows that there were 
altogether more good signals than bad signals and he will decide to invest. Of course, 
agent i can’t be sure that he really is the last agent. But if he isn’t, this means that 
there were fewer bad signals so far, while he can still be sure that there were Ti good 
signals. Hence, an agent who observes Ti >  ra/2 will always invest and, thus, trigger 
an AUC. ■
The value |  is just a lower bound for the critical mass of observable choices that triggers 
an AUC. Depending on the parameters’ values, AUCs may be triggered earlier. But AUCs 
are indeed part of all equilibria. Of course, this does not necessarily imply that AUCs will 
actually be triggered, since there is always the possibility of sufficiently many bad signals 
occurring such that the critical T i  that triggers an AUC may not be reached.
3.4 A n exam ple
It is now the moment to illustrate our theory through a simple example. The example will 
highlight some properties of the equilibrium analysis and will be the basis for the experiment 
that follows.
Consider the case in which n =  3 and r >  1 /2 . From Proposition 8  we know that 
A(0, (Ji) =  (Ti and from Proposition 8  we know that /*(2, cq) =  1 and that J j(l,1) =  1. But 
what do agents do after observing Ti =  1 and cq =  0. As is clear from the results illustrated 
in Table 1, this depends on further conditions on r and q. Let us first check under which
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conditions agent i rationally follows his bad signal. Recall that we are analysing a symmetric 
equilibrium, therefore suppose each opther agent j  chooses I j {  1,0) =  0. Then it is optimal
for agent i to do the same if his posterior for the good state is not bigger than 1/2, i.e., if
______________r[q( 1 -  g) +  2 g( 1 -  q)2}_______________< I
r[q( 1 -  q) +  2q{l -  q)2} +  (1  -  r)[q(l -  q) +  2q2(l -  q)] ~  2  
which is equivalent to
Similarly, A (1,0) =  1 is optimal if
r[q( 1 -  q) +  q{ 1 -  q)2\ >  (1  -  r)[q( 1 -  q) +  q2(l -  g)]. 
which is equivalent to
q <  3r — 1 =  q.
Observing that q < q, we obtain three equilibrium regions. For q < q there is a unique 
pure-strategy equilibrium in which 7,(1,0) =  1 and an AUC starts with 7* =  1. For q > q 
there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in which 7^(1,0 ) =  0 and an AUC starts only 
with Ti =  2. Finally, for q <  q <  q both the two pure-strategy equilibria exist and there is 
a mixed-strategy equilibrium as well—with 7<(1,0) =  -+^ ~ 4r.
3.5 A n experim ent
In order to check whether our theory can reasonably be expected to be of any empirical 
relevance we conducted a laboratory experiment. Basically, we implemented the three-agent 
example that we analysed above for two sets of parameters. In both treatments the signal 
precision is q =  0.7. But while the prior in treatment A is r =  1/2, the prior in treatment B 
is more optimistic, r =  3/4. For both treatments, theory predicts unique equilibria, shown
57
CHAPTER 3. AGGREGATE INFORMATION CASCADES
in Table 3.1. The only difference between the two treatments concerns the critical T that 
triggers an AUC. In treatment A an AUC is only triggered for T  =  2, while in treatment B 
an AUC starts already with T  =  1 .__________________________
Treatment A (r =  1/2) 
(7 =  0 ( 7 = 1
Treatment B (r =  3/4) 
(7 =  0 c r = l
II o 0 1 0 1
T =  1 0 1 1 1
II to 1 1 1 1
Table 3.1: Equilibrium investments in both treatments
The experiments were fully computerized and run at the ELSE laboratory at UCL in 
Spring 2005. In each session subject were matched in multiple groups of three at the begin­
ning of the experiment. The experiment consisted of 15 rounds of game playing and groups 
remained constant over time. We employed the strategy method, i.e., subjects had to indi­
cate for each possible combination of T  and a  whether or not they would invest. Specifically, 
they had to click radio buttons in a table that was precisely structured as the left panel of 
Table ??. Once everybody had submitted a strategy the computer drew the state of the 
world, the sequence in which agents had to decide and each agent’s signal. Using subjects’ 
strategies the computer then determined the outcome and subjects received feedback about 
their actual choice that was relevant, i.e., about their a  and T, as well as about the state u 
and their resulting payoff. They did not receive any feedback about other subjects’ behavior 
or outcomes. Altogether, we observed 57 subjects who were randomly assigned to the two 
treatments, with 11 groups in treatment A, and 8  groups in treatment B .2
Table 3.2 summarizes the results using an identical format to Table 3.1. For each com­
bination of <7 and T  the table shows the mean investment rate. A number of observations 
is in order. For most cells, average investments are actually quite close to equilibrium pre­
dictions. Also, standard errors (shown in parentheses) are rather small, so groups did not
2 One session we had scheduled for treatment B was cancelled due to too many no-shows.
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behave wildly different. However, there appear to be two outliers: the investment rates 
after, both, T  =  0 and a =  1 in treatment A and after T =  1 and a =  0 in treatment B, 
are substantially smaller than the equilibrium prediction of full investment. In case of the 
first deviation there seems to be some reluctance to go first. This reluctance disappears in 
treatment B where the prior is much more optimistic. The second deviation is different. 
Here and AUC should be triggered with T =  1 but observed investment rates are below 1/2. 
Again there is more scepticism in actual behavior than in equilibrium behavior.
Treatment A (r =  1/2) Treatment B (r =  3/4)
(7 =  0 (7 =  1 (7 =  0 (7 =  1
T =  0
0.15 0.56 0 .2 1 0 .8 6
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05)
T =  1
0.24 0.87 0.41 0.94
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
T =  2
0 .6 8 0.85 0.76 0.94
(0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04)
Table 3.2: Average investments rates in both treatments.
(Standard errors in parentheses)
However, the theory captures the comparative statics remarkably well. In particular, 
after T  =  1 and a  =  0, the only information set for which the equilibrium predictions differ 
for the two treatments, we do observe a substantial and highly significant difference between 
the two treatments. The doubling of the investment rate is significant at the 5% level.
It is interesting to compare our data for T  =  2 with results from standard information 
cascade experiments because with T  =  2 subjects know for sure in which position they 
are in the sequence and they also know the entire history, namely that everybody before 
them invested. We observe that the majority of subjects does herd in this case in both 
treatments. But herding is far from perfect in this case. However, as it turns out this reluc­
tance pretty much mirrors the data from standard cascade experiments (see, for example,
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the nice overview in Kubler and Weizsacker 2005). With a more optimistic prior the reluc­
tance becomes smaller. This, too, has been observed in the previous literature (and is also 
documented in Kubler and Weizsacker.)
Overall, we consider the results from our experiment encouraing. While not offering a 
full-fledged empirical analysis of our model it does lend its credibility some support and 
should, in fact, encourage further investigations.
3.6 D iscussion
We have introduced a new model of aggregate information cascades. The crucial difference 
between our model and the models already in the literature is that only one action taken by 
agents is observable to others who, when it is their turn, simply receive aggregate information 
about how many others before them took the observable action. We argue that this setup 
is in many cases realistic, for example, when entrepreneurs seek investors they will typically 
not inform new investors whom they approach about how many others have turned them 
down but, surely, they will mention who else decided previoulsy to invest in their project. 
This asymmetry in observability, which in many cases arises naturally, dramatically affects 
all equilibria in such games. Most importantly, there can be no down cascades. If an action 
is unobservable, there can be never information cascades where agents take this action.
This has an important consequence for applications where a third party can decide which 
information it is to release. Consider the case of a central health agency that has observes 
how many doctors choose a new treatment to cure some diseases. There are two potentially 
grave scenarios: The new treatment is better but everybody sticks to the old. Or the old 
treatment is better but everybody switches to the new. While both scenarios are bad, from 
the view point of the central agency one might be much worse than the other. Say, that the 
worse scenario is the one where the new treatment is better but not adopted. In that case 
we have shown is that by withholding information, i.e., by publishing only the number of
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doctors who previously decided to switch and by withholding the information about those 
who decided to stay with the conservative treatment, the central agency can rule out the 
worst case where the old treatment is administered by all docotors despite the superiority of 
the new. Of course, from the viewpoint of the agents more information will always be better 
than less and, if there are no externalities, total welfare will be reduced if some information 
is withheld. But if there are externalities, say, if this is about life and death and if patients’ 
care more about their own survival than their doctors do then the central agency may indeed 
have very good reasons to withhold some information it has access to.
Finally, we provide a first experimental test of our model. The theory organizes the data 
remarkably well. In particular, all major comparative statics are as predicted. However, we 
also observe an interesting anomaly: a pronounced reluctance to go first in an environment 
with a fifty-fifty prior. The intuition that an empty restaurant may be bad news is perhaps 
deeply rooted—rendering our theoretical result perhaps non-trivial and inducing subjects’ 
deviation from its prescription. Nevertheless, the vast majority of decisions does follow the 
equilibrium prediction which we view as encouraging for our theory.
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377 A ppendix
3.7.1 Instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
Please be quiet during the entire experiment. Do not talk to your neighbours and do 
not try to look at their screens. Simply concentrate on what you have to do. If you have a 
question, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer it privately.
You are participating in an economics experiment in which you interact with two other 
participants for 15 rounds. There are more participants in this room, but you will interact 
with only two of them.
Depending on your choices, the other two participants’ choices and some luck you can 
earn a considerable amount of money. You will receive the money immediately after the 
experiment. Notice that all participants have the same instructions.
T he experim ent
What you have to do
You will have to decide whether you want to invest in a project or not. The project may 
be good or not and we will give you some useful information about how the chances are. 
Additionally, you will also know something about what the other two participants decided 
to do.
What determines whether the investment is good or not
The computer will decide randomly whether in a given round the investment is good or 
not. The two possibilities are equally likely. This is equivalent to say that the computer will 
choose whether the investment is good or not by tossing of a coin.
Note that if in a given round the investment is good, it is good for all three participants. 
Similarly, if it is bad, it is bad for all three of you.
What you earn if you decide to invest or not
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In real life, if you choose a good investment the prize is that you enjoy a good return. 
And if it is bad, the cost is that you have spent money on something that was not profitable. 
In our experiment, if the project is good and you choose to invest we give you £3 for the 
smart decision. If, instead, you decide not to invest, then you get nothing. Similarly, if the 
project is bad and you decide not to invest, we pay you £3 for the smart decision. And if 
you decide to invest, we pay you nothing.
How you can make your decision
As we said the computer will choose one of the two projects. Of course, we will not tell 
you which one has been chosen. But we will give you a piece of information.
If the project is good, then the computer will draw a ball from an urn containing 70 green 
and 30 red balls. If it is bad, it will draw a ball from an urn containing 70 red and 30 green 
balls. You (and only you) will be told the colour of this ball. Clearly if the ball is green, it is 
more likely (but not sure) that the project is good. If it red, it is more likely (but not sure) 
that it is bad.
Note that the computer will draw a different ball for each participant. It will choose a 
ball for you and then replace it in the urn. Then a ball for another participant and then 
replace it. And so on. Therefore, it is well possible that you receive a green ball and another 
participant a red one, and vice versa.
This is not the only information that you will get. In the next paragraph you will discover 
why.
When you make your decision
You and the other two participants will make the decision to invest or not in the project 
in sequence. Therefore, you may be the first, or the second, or the third. Your position in 
the sequence is assigned to you randomly by the computer. Whether you will be first, or 
second, or third is equally likely. However, we will not tell you your position. But we will 
tell you the number of people who have decided to invest before you.
Let us briefly look at the different possibilities that can arise. You might see that two
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others have decided to invest in which case you know that you must be the last to make
a decision. If you see that just one other participant has invested before you the situation
is less clear. Obviously, you are not the first in the sequence. You might be the second
and the first might have decided to invest. But you might also be the last with one of your
predecessors having decided to invest and the other having decided to pass the opportunity.
Finally, you might observe that none of the others has decided to invest so far. In that case
you might be the first in the sequence. But you might also be second and the first passed
the opportunity, or you might be the third and both others decided not to invest.
The 'procedure
At the beginning of each round the computer will decide whether the project is good or 
bad. Moreover, it will draw a ball for you and one for each other participant. And it will 
decide the sequence in which the three of you decide.
Then it comes to your decision. But notice instead of telling you your ball colour and 
the number of people who have decided to invest before you, we will do something different. 
We will ask you to make your decision for each possible case. We will ask you to make a 
decision to invest or not depending on the number of people who have already decided to 
invest and on the colour of your ball. Specifically, you will see a table like this:
Green Ball Red Ball
Nobody has invested before you
One other has invested before you
Two others have invested before you
For each possible combination you will have to decide whether you invest or not. Of 
course, when we compute your payoff, we will take into account only the decision corre­
sponding to the actual situation (that will be revealed to you afterwards). The other five 
decisions will not be taken into account. Therefore, you can decide for each case as you if 
knew the ball colour and the actual number of people who decided to enter before you.
Is all this clear? If not, do not worry, here are two examples.
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Example 1
Suppose you make the following decisions:
Green Ball Red Ball
Nobody has bought before you NO NO
One other has bought before you NO INVEST
Two others have bought before you NO INVEST
At the end of the round the computer tells you that actually in this round you 
received the red ball. Moreover, that you were third and another participant decided to 
invest before you. This is equivalent to the case “One other has invested before you”. 
Therefore, we will compute your payoff considering only your decision to INVEST for the 
case “One other has INVESTED before you”. All the other decisions are irrelevant. Hence, 
if the project is good, we will pay you £3.
Example 2
Suppose you make the following decisions:
Green Ball Red Ball
Nobody has bought before you NO NO
One other has bought before you INVEST INVEST
Two others have bought before you INVEST INVEST
At the end of the round the computer tells you that actually in this round you received 
the green ball and you were first. This is equivalent to the case “Nobody has invested 
before you”. Therefore, we will compute your payoff considering only your decision NOT 
to INVEST for the case “Nobody has invested before you”. All the other decisions are 
irrelevant.
Procedures for each round
Remember that the experiment is organized into different rounds and that within each 
round you will have to make six investment decisions. So, now it is time to summarize what 
happens within each round.
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1 . At the beginning of each round the computer randomly chooses whether the project 
is good or bad. The project is the same for all participants. But you will not be told 
which project has been chosen.
2. The computer draws a ball from an urn for each participant. The ball is drawn and 
then replaced, so that the total number of balls in the urn is always the same before 
the computer makes another draw. The computer draws a ball for participant one 
and puts it back into the urn. Then it does the same for participant 2. And then for 
participant
3. If the project is good, the computer draws the ball from an urn containing 70 green 
and 30 red balls. If it is bad, from an urn containing 70 red and 30 green balls. You 
will be the only one knowing your ball colour.
4. The computer decides randomly which participant is first, who is second and who is 
third.
5. You will make your decisions for the six cases illustrated above. Of course, given that 
you do not know in which case you actually are, you will have to think of the best 
solution for each of the six cases in which you may be.
Once the round is over, you will be informed of your ball colour. We will also tell how 
many other participants decided to invest before you. And of course we will tell you whether 
the project was indeed good or bad and how much you earned.
Then, we will repeat the same procedure for the second round at the beginning of which 
the computer will choose again a project and so on. Note that at the beginning of each 
round the computer chooses the project always with an equal chance of being good or bad, 
independently of what was chosen in previous rounds. We will repeat the same procedures 
for altogether 15 rounds.
Final payment
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For the simple fact that you showed up in time for the experiment you earn £4. The 
rest of the payment depends on how you perform. The computer will randomly choose one 
round out of the first 5 rounds, one among the 6 th through the 10th and one among the 11th 
though the 15th. Your payment will depend on how you performed in the selected rounds. 
We will sum up your payoffs in these three rounds. Your final payment will be equal to this 
amount plus the £4 for showing up.
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Learning Trust
4.1 Introduction
Reputation building in repeated trust games requires that trustors have some information 
about trustees’ behavior in the past. Consider a buyer-seller framework where sequential 
exchange induces a moral hazard problem. First, buyers make a decision about whether or 
not to send some money to a seller who has advertised a good. After having received the 
money, the seller then decides whether or not to deliver the promised good. In such a market 
a seller can build up a reputation for being honest if and only if buyers can at least partially 
observe the seller’s trading history.
Thus, providing buyers with information about sellers’ past should help to alleviate the 
moral hazard problem. We shall call such feedback provision to buyers one-sided market 
transparency. The first result that we establish in this paper is that it indeed helps to 
improve efficiency in laboratory markets that suffer from moral hazard. However, our key 
finding is that two-sided market transparency where both, buyers and sellers, have access to 
sellers’ trading history improves market performance even further. From the vantage point of 
orthodox theory, this is a surprising result. Whether or not sellers can observe other sellers’ 
past should be irrelevant. But as we conclusively show, it is not.
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The key to understanding this result is very simple. There are some sellers who, when 
left to their own devices, simply do not understand the mechanics of reputation building. 
In markets with one-sided transparency only, they make use of any opportunity to rip off 
their customers despite the drastic consequences this implies for their reputation. Typically, 
it does not take long until such sellers establish a firm reputation as cheats and lose all 
business. This is different in markets with two-sided transparency because here sellers can 
learn from other sellers. In particular, sellers who initially do not understand the incentives 
for reputation building can now observe others who do. And they can see that those who 
do, get more business and are soon much better off than they are. Given a second chance, 
they can now imitate successful reputation building. This process of social learning gave this 
paper its title.
While the benefits of one-sided market transparency have already been documented in 
the literature,1 the interaction of social learning and reputation incentives that makes two- 
sided transparency superior in our experiment has, to the best of our knowledge, not been 
demonstrated before.2 Of course, the often cited example of ebay’s feedback mechanism is one 
that implements two-sided transparency. On ebay, everybody, buyers and sellers, have access 
to information about sellers’ history. However, previous studies have—probably guided by 
orthodox reasoning—ignored the role of providing sellers with information about each other. 
Our results suggest that, in fact, two-sided transparency is an important ingredient for the 
design of well-functioning markets that are prone to moral hazard.
4.2 Experim ental design and procedures
In our experiments subjects play the binary-choice trust game shown in Figure 4-1. Payoffs 
are in pence and strategies and player roles are labelled exactly as in the experiment. As-
1See, for example, Keser (2002), Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2004) or Bohnet and Huck (2004).
2 Studies that show how subjects can learn from other subjects to improve their decision making in other 
contexts include Offerman and Sonnemans (1998) and Slembeck and Tyran (2004).
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A
A: 20p 
B: 15p
rightleft
A: 5p 
B: 50p
A: 3 Op 
B: 25p
Figure 4-1: The trust game.
suming that players maximise some monotone function of their monetary payoff and that 
this is common knowledge the game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the first mover 
chooses “X”, i.e., not to trust, and the second mover chooses “right”, i.e., not to honour 
trust if being trusted. In the following we will refer to the first mover as the buyer and to 
the second mover as the seller.
Payoffs are deliberately chosen to be asymmetric in order to make the moral hazard 
problem as difficult as possible.3 Subjects play this game in all treatments for 30 periods. 
Keeping their roles they are randomly rematched at the start of each period. Each matching 
group consists of four sellers and four buyers.
The treatments differ in what subjects know about the past. In the baseline treatment, 
N o I n f o , subjects have no information about the past. Whenever they are rematched, 
they are simply told “You have been rematched with a new participant” without knowing 
anything about this particpant’s identity or history. In all other treatments sellers can be 
identified with labels (Bl, B2, B3, and B4). In treatment R e p u t a t i o n , all buyers know 
all sellers’ past. In treatment I m it a t io n  all sellers know each other’s past. And, finally,
3With symmetric payoffs after honored trust (Y, right) subjects find it much easier to achieve efficiency 
already in one-shot games, see, for example, Bacharach, Guerra, and Zizzo (2001) or Bolton, Katok, and 
Ockenfels (2004).
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Sellers know sellers’ history 
No Yes
Buyers know No N o In f o  I m it a t io n
sellers’ history Yes R e p u t a t i o n  T w o - S id e d
Table 4.1: The 2x2 design.
in treatment Two-Sided both, sellers and buyers, can observe all sellers’ past.4 This 2x2 
design is summarized in Table 4.1.
The experiments were computerised5 and sellers’ history was made available using a 
simple graphical tool. In the left part of the screen subjects could see four columns consisting 
of 30 hash signs, each column representing one seller. Each row represented one period. 
Initially, all hash signs were white. Then, after each period, hash signs in the row representing 
this period changed their colour. They turned black if the seller had not to make a decision 
because his buyer did not trust him. They turned green if the seller honoured the buyer’s 
trust. And they turned red if the seller exploited the buyer’s trust. This colour coding 
is, of course, obvious and makes it rather easy to read the comparatively complex history 
information.
The experiments were conducted at the University of London. For each of the four treat­
ments we conducted six separate sessions, each with eight subjects who had been recruited 
via emails to the college’s entire student body. Altogether, 192 subjects participated in 
the experiments which lasted on average less than an hour. Average earnings were £11.07 
(including a £5 show-up fee).
4In each treatment, the information structure is publicly known. For example, in R e p u t a t i o n ,  both, 
buyers and sellers know that buyers can oberseve sellers’ past while sellers cannot.
5We used Fischbacher’s (1999) z-tree.
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NoInfo Reputation Imitation Two-Sided
0.19 044 019 062
(0.11) (0.26) (0.16) (0.23)
0.21 0.31 0.14 0.43
(0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15)
0.05 0.17 0.04 0.29
(0.05) (0.14) (0.04) (0.18)
Table 4.2: Average honor, trust, and efficiency rates in all four treatments. (Standard 
deviations in parentheses.)
4.3 R esults
4.3.1 A  static view
Table 4.2 shows, for each treatment, average honour rates, i.e., the average frequency with 
which sellers honour buyers’ trust, average trust rates, i.e., the average frequency with which 
buyers trust sellers, and, finally, average efficiency rates, i.e., the average frequency with 
which subjects play (Y, right) and reach the individually rational efficient outcome (which, 
from here on, we shall simply call the “efficient outcome” or refer to it as “efficient trade”) .6 
Figures 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 show the same information graphically and, in addition, honour, 
trust, and efficiency rates for, both, the best and the worst session in each treatment. A few 
observations are in order.
1 . In treatments without incentives for reputation building (N o I n f o  and I m it a t io n ) 
honour rates are very low (below 20%) and so are trust rates. Consequently, there is 
hardly any efficient trade.
2. Introducing incentives for reputation building in treatment R e p u t a t i o n  more than 
doubles the average honour rate which also boosts the trust rate. As a result the 
number of efficient trades is more than tripled. However, there is considerable variance 
between sessions and the overall outcome is far from perfect.
6 Notice that the sum of payoffs is equal in both end nodes that can be reached after the first mover 
decision to trust. Again, this is a feature that makes it harder for subjects to cooperate. See also footnote 3.
honour rate 
Trust rate 
Efficiency rate
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Figure 4-2: Honour rates in all treatments.
3. The reputation effects are considerably enhanced in treatment Two-Sided where both, 
buyers and sellers, have access to sellers’ trading history. Again, there are considerable 
differences between sessions.
Conducting statistical tests7 reveals that the effects of introducing incentives for repu­
tation building are highly significant.8 However, despite the consistently higher averages 
in treatment Tw o-Sided, tests fail to show any significant benefits of two-sided market 
transparency. Comparing treatments R eputation  and Two-Sided, we find no significant 
differences—neither for honour rates, nor for trust and efficiency rates. Does this mean that 
there are indeed no effects of added market transparency and that, as orthodox theory pre­
dicts, it only matters whether or not buyers can observe sellers? In the next subsection we 
shall argue that this conclusion would be premature.
7 We always take one session as one independent observation and then perform pairwise MWU-tests with 
six against six observations.
8 Comparing N o I n f o  with REPUTATION we find that, both, honour and efficiency rates are significantly 
higher in the latter (one-sided p  =  0.023 and p  =  0.074, respectively). Comparing IMITATION and T w o- 
SlDED reveals that all three rates are higher when buyers know sellers’ history [p  =  0.005 for trust, p  =  0.008 
for honour, and p  =  0.004 for efficiency).
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Figure 4-3: Trust rates in all treatments.
N o I n f o  R e p u t a t i o n  I m i t a t i o n  T w o - S i d e d
Figure 4-4: Efficiency rates in all treatments.
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N o I n f o  R e p u t a t i o n  I m it a t io n  T w o - S id e d
Honour crowding effect 
Trust crowding effect 
Efficiency crowding effect
0 .1 1 0.05 0.19 0.33
(0.17) (0.31) (0.16) (0.49)
-0.04 -.0 .06 -0.03 0 .2 2
(0 .1 1 ) (0.28) (0.15) (0.26)
0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0.04 0 .2 0
(0.07) (0 .2 1 ) (0.04) (0.23)
Table 4.3: Crowding effects in all four treatments. Crowding effect is computed as aver­
age rate minus initial rate. (Standard deviations in parentheses.) Notice that the honour 
crowding effect in treatment I m it a t io n  is due to an initial honour rate of zero.
4.3.2 A dynamic view
Two-sided market transparency has the advantage that sellers who do not understand the 
mechanics of reputation building can learn from other sellers who do. If such learning 
is important one would predict that two-sided transparency crowds in honour, trust, and 
efficiency over time.9 To test for such dynamic effects we will, therefore, analyse a very 
simple measure capturing the market dynamics. For each session we shall compute the 
difference between the average honour (trust/efficiency) rate over time and the initial honour 
(trust/efficiency) rate. In the case of trust and efficiency, these initial rates are simply 
computed for the first round. This approach does not work for initial honour rates since 
there are many sellers who do not have to make a decision in their first round. Hence to 
compute initial honour rates, we take for each seller the first instance where he or she had a 
decision to make.10 Table 4.3 shows the differences between average and initial rates for all 
four treatments.
The table reveals rather dramatic effects of two-sided transparency. The average honour 
rate is 33 percentage points higher than the initial rate. This basically amounts to one third 
of the seller population learning that building up a good reputation pays. Put differently, it
9Bohnet, Frey, and Huck (2001) provide a theoretical model for crowding in of trustworthiness.
10Notice that these measures, while somewhat crude, are extremely clean. In particular, more sophisticated 
measures for the initial propensities to trust or honour would unavoidably be confounded with learning or 
other dynamic effects. Also, by taking simply one ratio we avoid making any assumptions about the functional 
form of the dynamics.
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amounts to every third seller turning from a cheat into a reliable trading partner.
In treatment R e p u t a t io n  there is also a slight increase in honour rates but, the effect 
is both, smaller and without consequences for overall market performance. Under two- 
sided market transparency increasing honour rates translate into increasing trust and, hence, 
increasing efficiency rates. In treatment T w o -S id e d  overall efficiency is 20 percentage points 
higher than initial efficiency while in all other treatments efficiency does virtually not change 
over time.
Not surprisingly, these dynamic effects of two-sided market transparency are not only 
strong in size but also highly significant. A comparison of treatments R e p u t a t i o n  and 
T w o - S id e d  tests for the additional benefit of sellers observing other sellers in the presence 
of incentives for reputation building. Pairwise tests reveal that all three crowding effects 
are significantly higher in T w o - S i d e d  than in R e p u t a t i o n .11 Thus, we see that two-sided 
market transparency has indeed an important beneficial effect for market performance that 
could not have been predicted by orthodox theory.
4.4 Conclusion
We examine the effects of different forms of feedback information on the performance of 
markets that suffer from moral hazard problems due to sequential exchange. We find that, 
as orthodox theory predicts, providing buyers with information about sellers’ trading his­
tory boosts market performance. With such one-sided market transparency sellers have an 
incentive to build up a reputation as reliable trading partners and many sellers use this 
opportunity, which helps to alleviate moral hazard. This beneficial effect of incentives for 
reputation building is considerably enhanced if sellers, too, can observe other sellers’ trading 
history. Apparently some sellers do not understand the mechanics of reputation building on
11 The p -values are p  =  0.055 for the crowding in of trust and honour and p  =  0.075 for the crowding in of 
efficiency (one-sided MWU-tests).
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their own. However, with two-sided market transparency these sellers can learn from those 
who manage to build a good reputation. Thus, there is a systematic learning process turning 
sellers who initially cheat into reliable trading partners. This dramatically increases market 
performance over time.
This result adds to the existing literature on feedback information, some of which has 
been motivated by the success of ebay’s celebrated feedback mechanism. It suggests that 
ebay benefits from having sellers’ feedback rating freely available to both market sides. While 
this was perhaps a very natural design choice for ebay where people act as both, buyers and 
sellers, this might be less obvious for specialised trading and procurement platforms where 
the two market sides are more separated. Here two-sided transparency might be a less 
obvious but—as our findings suggest—very recommendable choice.
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Chapter 5 
Supermarket entry and planning 
regulation
5.1 Introduction
The UK retail sector has been the focus of policy concern because of its relatively low 
productivity growth, high prices and concentrated market structure. The wholesale and 
retail sector account for around one-fifth of the UK’s productivity gap, with the US and 
supermarkets accounting for the single biggest component of this sector. 1 Additionally, the 
supermarket industry has been repeatedly investigated by the UK competition authorities. 
The literature has emphasised the importance of entry to productivity growth in US retail, 
perhaps enabling the more rapid introduction of ICT in newer stores or reallocation from 
less productive to more productive stores. In contrast, in the UK growth has come mainly 
from incumbents.2 One potential reason for this productivity gap that is emphasised by the 
Competition Commission 2002 report is that most stores in the UK operate below efficient 
scale.
1See, for example, Griffith, Harrison, Haskel and Sako (2003), Figure 3.
2 For the US see Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2002) and for the UK see Haskel and Khawaja (2003).
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Attention has focused on planning regulation as one of the root causes. An influential 
report by McKinsey (1998) highlighted planning regulations as one of the major policy issues 
affecting productivity in this sector. And in his recent Pre-Budget Report, on 5 December 
2005, the Chancellor and Deputy Prime Minister announced a review of the land use planning 
system in England. It will consider how land use regulation affects economic growth.
Yet there is relatively little work studying the overall impact or cost of planning reg­
ulation. A notable exception is a paper by Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) who show that 
planning regulation in France created an important barrier to entry for large supermarkets. 
Evaluation by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) have suggested that plan­
ning regulation has affected entry by new large stores.3 But this work does not control for 
other factors that may affect store entry decisions. For example, a report by CB Hillier 
Parker to the ODPM notes that "... food retailers are changing their store formats and fo­
cusing more on town centre and edge of centre sites, this has been as much due to commercial 
considerations as to [planning regulations] . . .”
Our interest in this paper is to quantify the impact that planning regulation has had on 
market structure in the UK supermarket industry, and thus the cost of this regulation. This 
is of course only part of the story, as these costs then need to be set against any potential 
benefits. Before 1993 planning regulation in England was decentralised. Over the late 70s 
and 80s there was rapid growth in large out-of-town store formats. Driven by a desire to stem 
this trend, which government feared was harming social cohesion in communities, reforms 
in 1993 and more stringently in 1996 centralised planning regulation and changed it to 
encouraged in-town (small) store formats and discourage out-of-town (large) store formats.
What impact would we expect planning regulation to have on equilibrium market struc­
ture?
We would expect it to restrict the number of large stores and increase the number of small
3See, for example, ODPM (2005), para 1.5, “.. emerging evidence suggests that since the mid-1990s na­
tional planning policy has had a significant impact in terms of increasing the proportion of retail development 
locating in town centres...”
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stores. Unsurprisingly, after the reforms we see an increase in town centre stores and an 
increase in smaller store formats. However, as highlighted by the quote above, other factors 
may have also affected this shift towards smaller store formats. In particular, recent strategy 
diversification by several firms in the supermarket industry, for example Tesco moving into 
the Express and Metro format and Sainsbury moving into the Local format, suggests that 
at least some of the shift from large to small store format over the late 1990s may be due 
to changing consumer preferences and store strategy. So incorporating a model of consumer 
demand is crucial in isolating the effect of planning regulation on market structure and firm 
profits.
We take the model of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) as a starting point and estimate the 
impact of planning regulation on market equilibrium. We use regional variation in planning 
applications granted and treat these as exogenous. We assume that firms make decisions 
about entry into the large store format independently of the number of small stores whereas 
the decision to enter into the small store format takes the number of large stores as given.4
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the planning and land use 
regulations as they apply to grocery stores in England. Section 3 describes a model of 
supermarket entry and equilibrium market structure and our estimation strategy. Section 4 
discusses the data. Our results are shown in Section 5 and a final section concludes.
5.2 P lanning regulation
Land use regulation is often cited as an important barrier to entry0 and in the UK it has been 
held largely responsible for higher prices and lower labour productivity in retail stores, and 
particularly in supermarkets.6 However, land use regulation is rarely a barrier to all forms
4Some of the main papers are Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002).
5 See, inter alia, Djankov et al (2002), Bertrand and Kramatz (2002).
6 Bertrand and Kramatz (2002) show that such regulation in France has had a negative impact on em­
ployment. See also McKinsey (1996), Haskel and Khawaja (2003), Competition Commission (2000).
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of entry, but rather imposes a constraint on certain types of entry. A good example of this 
is English planning regulation. Rapid growth in the number of out-of-town supermarkets 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to concerns about out-of-centre development and the 
impact this was having on the vibrancy of city centres, and the possible impact this had on, 
for example, social exclusion. Changes to regulation sought to encourage, for example, retail 
development in town centres.
Land use regulation in England changed in 1993 and more importantly in 1996 with the 
introduction of Planning Policy Guideline 6  (PPG6 ). It changed in a way that favoured in 
town developments over out of town. PPG6  put forward the sequential approach which 
states that out-of-town centres should only be build as a last resort, if there is not viable city 
centre alternative. PPG6  stated that LPAs should take a ‘plan-led’ approach to development 
control. LPAs are required to have a development plan. This should set out the authority’s 
policies for the development and use of land in its area. LPAs should identify which centres 
should grow and identify sites for specific types of development where a need for additional 
provision has been identified. City, town and district centres should be the preferred locations 
for developments that attract many trips. This type of planning regulation therefore favours 
the opening of certain types of stores (smaller city centre stores) over other types of stores 
(larger out-of-town stores). What impact will such regulation have on profitability and 
market structure?
On the one hand, smaller stores may be less efficient (more costly) to run.7 On the other 
hand, there is a trade-off between higher fixed costs for larger out-of-town stores versus lower 
variable costs to run these stores. The over all impact will depend on: the strategic response
7 The Competition Commission (2000) report into supermarkets surveys the literature on economies of 
scale and argues that there are economies of scale up to 30,000 sq. m in supermarkets, but not after that. The 
economies of scale were especially in staff costs, which, the CC shows, are the bulk of value added in retailing. 
The CC present data on international comparisons of supermarket shop size. Britain has significantly fewer 
supermarkets and they are much smaller than the US, but they are larger than Continental Europe. In 
addition, US supermarkets are, on average just over 3,000 sq metres, which is just above the minimum scale 
required to achieve the highest levels of labour productivity. UK supermarkets are below that, suggesting 
that this might account for part of our productivity disadvantage.
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of firms that would have opened large stores, do they now open more small stores; the entry 
response of other firms, are other barriers to entry lower for small stores, did the presence 
of large out-of-town stores raise the entry barriers to small stores; the relative cost efficiency 
of small and large stores.8
5.3 A  m odel o f superm arket entry and equilibrium
We take Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), henceforth B&R, as our starting point and consider 
N  symmetric firms entering into a Cournot competition. We allow for two type of store - in 
town and out of town. As emphasised above, this is an important characteristics of the UK 
supermarket industry where there are two different types of stores - small city centre stores 
like Tesco Metro and Sainsbury Local and large often out of town supermarkets which were 
differentially affected by planning regulation.
We assume that demand for groceries takes the following form: consumers demand the 
bulk of their groceries in a one-stop shopping trip in big stores; they subsequently top-up 
with additional items that were forgotten or unexpectedly needed in small stores. Adding two 
product types to the simultaneous-move entry game of B&R introduces multiple equilibria 
(some of which might be mixed strategy equilibria) . 9 In order to get a unique pure-strategy 
equilibrium we need some additional assumptions. Mazzeo (1992) and Toivanen and Wa- 
terson (1999) model entry with more than one type of entrant and introduce two additional 
assumptions for uniqueness. First, they introduces Stackelberg competition, with an exoge­
nously defined sequence in which firms make irrevocable choices whether or not to enter, and 
of which type. This seems an implausible assumption for the supermarket industry where
8To the extent that retailing productivity growth is due to firms closing older, low productivity stores, 
and opening newer, high productivity shops to replace them, this might result in lower productivity growth, 
which may feed through into higher prices. Recent work has suggested that the adoption and use of ICT 
has been an important contributor to the US productivity acceleration of the late 1990s.
It is likely that ICT usage is higher and more effective in newer shops, but it is not clear whether a market 
with fewer large out-of-town stores or more small in-town-stores will lead to more entry and exit.
It may also be that ICT is easier to adopt in larger out-of-town stores.
9See Tamer (2002) for empirical strategies of estimating multiple equilibria in discrete games.
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there is no natural ordering. The second assumption is that the decrease in profits is larger 
if the competitor is of the same type, which seems natural.
In this paper we introduce differential fixed costs across store type to reflect the impact of 
planning regulation. This is easier and more natural to incorporate into a simultaneous move 
game. 10 More formally, we consider firms to play a three-stage game. In the initial stage, 
firms decide whether to enter by opening a big store. Once these entry decision have been 
made, small firms compete for the residual demand. Profits of large stores therefore do not 
depend on the presence of small stores, but small stores take the number of big stores into 
account when deciding whether to enter or not. Once firms have made their entry decisions 
symmetric price competition between each type ensues and payoffs are determined. We 
assume a free entry equilibrium - firms enter up to the point where profits cover fixed costs. 
The profits of firms that do not enter are normalised to zero.
In the Nash equilibrium the following inequalities hold (B  is the total number of big 
stores, is the number of big and small stores of others and CB,C s  are the fixed
costs of a big and a small store):
(1 ) entry of Big  if HiB(B-i) > CB
(2) entry of Small if I lis^ -t, B) > Cs
(3) exit from Big  if IIiB{B^i — 1 ) < 0
(4) exit from Small if IIts(<S'_i — 1, B) < 0
A store enters if profits are sufficient to cover fixed costs, and they exit the market if they 
make negative net profits. To prove the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium we need 
to impose some structure on the profit function. One natural restriction is that firm profits 
decline in rivals’ entry so we assume that profits decline in number of big firms in the first 
and second stage and profits decline in number of small firms on the second stage.
10In a sequential game like Mazzeo’s (1992) varying fixed costs would effect the entry sequence as well as 
the product choice, so he focusses on varying variable costs by type.
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5.3.1 Market demand and supply
Market demand is characterised in the following way. Consumers demand a composite good 
“groceries” and thus aggregate demand can be modelled in the form
Q =  d(X, P)S(Y)  (5.1)
where Q is total quantity of groceries demanded, d( X , P)  is the demand of a representative 
consumer, which is a function of demographic variables X  and the price P  of the groceries. 
S(Y)  denotes the number of consumers. So the demand function is homogeneous of degree 
one. We also assume that demand increases linearly in 5 . 11
We can take two different approaches to introducing different store formats, one through 
the demand function, the other through the cost function.
The dominant model of consumer shopping behaviour is the one-stop shopping model. 12 
Different store formats arise because of consumer preferences and shopping habits. Con­
sumers demand groceries. They buy a large portion of their groceries in one shopping trip 
and then top-up forgotten items of perishables in small trips. For the one-stop shopping trip 
they prefer a large variety of different goods and therefore prefer a large store format. For 
the top-up shopping, on the other hand, a small convenient store that is in close proximity is 
preferred. In this case we can model aggregate quantity demanded from one-stop shopping 
as Q i and top-up shopping by Q2 as
Q =  Q i + Q 2 =  di(X, P)S(Y)  +  d2(X,  P, Qi)S(Y)  (5.2)
where d\ (X , P)  is the demand of a representative consumer from one-stop shopping and 
d2(X,  P, Qi)  the demand from top-up shopping. Both are a function of demographic variables 
X  and the price P  of the groceries. S ( Y ) denotes the number of consumers. This demand
11 This assumption is crucial since non-linear demand in S  might lead to multiple equilibria.
12See, inter alia, Smith (2004), CC (2000).
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function is homogeneous of degree one. We also assume that demand increases linearly in
S. Demand from one-stop shopping is unaffected by the demand from top-up shopping, the 
cross derivatives ^ - is  equal to zero, can be different from zero since it depends on the 
residual demand after one-stop shopping of Qi.  This assumption of independent demand for 
one-stop shopping is fairly strong, but it allows us to estimate the resulting profit functions 
for big format stores independently from small format stores, to investigate the differential 
impact of planning regulation, using an ordered probit model. In estimating the resulting 
profit functions for small format stores we include the number of big stores in line with our 
residual demand hypothesis.
An alternative approach to introducing different store types is from the supply side. On 
the supply side firms profits equal revenue minus costs. Firms incur fixed costs of F{R)  
and have per capita variable costs of V(W)  where W  are variable cost shifters and R  are 
exogenous variables that affect fixed costs. As mentioned above we assume a free entry 
equilibrium - firms enter up to the point where profits cover fixed costs. Fixed costs can vary 
with the number of firm in the market, so the fixed costs for a duopolist can be different 
than for a triopolist. Thus firms have U-shaped average total costs, declining initially due to 
fixed costs and rising later due to marginal costs. Consider two supply curves. The first is 
for firms operating at or above minimum efficient scale (30,000 sq ft)13, these have high fixed 
costs and low variable costs, but variable costs rising at some point. The second supply curve 
is for small firms, with low fixed costs but high variables costs. Where demand is sufficient 
to cover the fixed costs of a large firm, then they will enter. If excess demand is smaller than 
the amount needed to cover fixed cost, then a small store will enter.
13 Definition of the Competition Commission (2000).
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5.3.2 Firm profits
Assuming profits to be additively separable in observed and unobserved components we have 
the following profit function, where subscript n denotes the number of firms (1  monopoly, 2  
duopoly etc.), j  denotes the area and f  denotes the store format (big or small).
n  njf =  Sf(Yj )Vf (Wj , a, 0) +  Ff(Rj,  7n, 9) +  enjf (5.3)
where a, (3, 7  and 6 are parameters to be estimated, Yj are factors that vary across region 
and affecting market size, Wj are factors that vary across region and affect per capita profits 
(demand and variable costs) and Rj  are factors that shift fixed costs (e.g. regulatory con­
straints) and the unobserved error e captures idiosyncratic variation in profits. We assume 
that e follows a normal distribution and is independent across markets and from observables, 
with zero mean and constant variance.
We model firms per capita variable profits as a linear function of the observables W  ,
V/ ( W, a , 0 ) = a  +  0 / Wj (5.4)
Fixed costs depend on exogenous variables R,  including planning regulation and land 
prices, and a market structure level unobservable, 7n
N
Ff(Rj »In) =  7l +  OfRj +  ^ 2  (5-5)
n= 2
The 7n terms allow for later entrants to have higher fixed costs. If we observe 7n > 0 we 
conclude that later entrants have higher fixed costs.
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5.3.3 Empirical model
Under the assumption that the error is i.i.d. in profit specification (5.3), we can write the 
probabilities of observing a particular market structure for the baseline case of no store 
type differentiation in the following way. Let IIn denote the estimated per firm profits - so 
the monopolist’s profit is III =  III +  e . We assume that profits can be ordered, so that 
IIi > II2 > II3 >  .. > Iljv, i.e. a monopolist’s profit is higher than a duopolist’s and higher 
than a triopolist’s. We assume that there is no heterogeneity between firms, we can write 
any market structure profits in terms of monopoly profits14
III =  n n +  Mn-l (5 -6 )
where fin is the constant difference between n and n — 1 profits and fin >  /in_i- Thus 
the probabilities of observing a particular market structure with $  the cumulative normal 
density function can be written as
•  Empty market
Pr(y =  0) =  Pr(ni +  e <  0) =  Pr(e < - H i )  =  1 -  (^TTi) (5.7)
•  Monopoly
Pr(y =  1) =  Pr(IIi +  e >  0 and n 2 +  e < 0) =  Pr(—IIi < e <  —n 2) (5.8)
=  * ( S i )  -  $ ( n 2) =  *(/*! -  H i) -  * ( - H i )  (5.9)
14In the case of no firm heterogeneity this is an unproblematic assumption, but with firm heterogeneity it
would be more crucial.
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•  Duopoly
Pr(y =  2) =  Pr(n2 +  £ >  0 and n 3 +  e < 0) =  Pr(—n 2 < e <  — n 3) (5.10)
=  $ ( n 2) -  $ ( n 3) =  $(//2 -  n o  -  $ ( /q  -  n o  (5.11)
•  Triopoly
Pr(y =  3) =  Pr(n3 +  £ > 0) =  Pr(e > n 3) (5.12)
=  $ ( n 3) =  i - $ 0 i 2 - n o  (5.13)
•  etc.
The probabilities sum to one.
Under these assumptions we can now estimate the equilibrium market structure using 
a standard ordered probit model. The estimated coefficients can be directly translated as 
structural coefficients of the underlying monopoly profit function, and with the estimated 
constants /in we can also recover the profit function coefficients.
The choice probabilities allow identification only up to an arbitrary normalisation. If 
we make assumptions about the constant coefficients - either fi0 or /30 is 0 , we assume 
/30 =  0 -.and the variance of the error term equals unity (as in Bresnahan and Reiss). Using 
equations (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) we can rewrite profits as,
IIIj — Yjicx. d- PWj) — (7i d~ @Rj) d- (5.14)
^2 j  =  Yj((* d- &W j)  — { 'h  +  QRj  +  7 2) +  £ j ,
f l 3j =  Y j ( a  +  P W j )  — (7 X +  ORj  +  7 2 +  7 3) d- £j
etc. (5.15)
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If we define dummy variables 12j =  1 if there are two or more stores in j, 13j =  1 if there
are three of more stores in j , etc., we can collapse these into one expression,
n nj =  aYj +  fiYjWj. -  7i -  72 - . . . - 9 R j +  £j. (5.16)
The i s  can be interpreted as the thresholds between monopoly and duopoly profits and 
triopoly and monopoly profits, respectively. For the /3 and 0 we can only directly interpret 
the sign: a positive sign shifts to higher categories when x increases, a negative sign shifts 
to lower categories when x increases. In order to interpret the magnitudes we calculate 
marginal effects for the different /? and 6.
5.4 D ata
In order to estimate the model described above we need data on: the location and character­
istics of existing and new store; planning applications and decisions taken by LEAs; regional 
demographics. These data are available from several different sources.
5.4.1 Superm arket entry and location
Opening dates and size of each grocery store in England comes from the Institute of Grocery 
Distribution (IGD) data. The data comprises 12,503 observations of grocery stores in the 
UK. It covers all large chain stores and Co-ops and around 80% of independent stores. The 
data record the company name, the fascia, the postcode, the opening and closing dates.
Figure 5.1 shows the number of new store openings over time. The grey shaded firms 
represent the larger store formats and we can see that at the beginning of the 90s up to 
1996 the majority of store openings took place in this large format. After 1996 the number 
of smaller store format (coded in green colours) openings increased substantially and the 
number of big store openings decreased at the same time.
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The UK supermarket industry is dominated by four main companies whose market shares 
in terms of grocery sales add to around 75% (these are Asda, Sainsbury, Safeway/Morrisons 
and Tesco). Eventhough our empirical analysis takes all stores into account Figures 5.2-5.6 
use the big four to illustrate the main trend. In Figure 5.2 we see that since 1997 the number 
of new out-of-town stores opening has declined, while the number of new town-centre stores 
opening has increased. The CC (2000) report suggests that the minimum efficient scale for 
supermarkets is around 30,000 sq ft. Figure 5.2 shows the number of new store openings 
above and below this size, with the vertical bar indicating the introduction of new planning 
regulation. There has been a marked increase in the number of smaller stores opening, 
suggesting that this could be a reason for the lower efficiency growth in the UK.
Figure 5.3 shows that much of the new store opening was accounted for by Tesco, and 
Figure 5.4 shows that this was dominated by the Tesco Express format. As highlighted above, 
an open question is the extent to which this diversification was driven by planning regulation, 
or a strategic decision by Tesco to differentiate itself and target a different demographic (or 
a response to changes in consumer preferences towards this type of format). We hope to be 
able to disentangle these effects in our empirical analysis.
We identify two types of stores, those above and below 30,000 square feet.10 We consider 
the number of stores in a postcode sector (this is the first word plus the first character of the 
second word, e.g. for the postcode WC1E 7AE the postcode sector is WC1E7).A postcode 
sector has a median diameter of 2.4 kilometer and an average population of 6700 people. 
For small stores we use demographic variables within the postcode sector. For large stores 
we use demographic variables for all postcode sectors within a 10 km radius.16,17,18
15 This is the minimum efficient scale defined by Competition Commission in its 2000 report on the su­
permarket industry. As a robustness check we also consider stores above and below 15,000 square feet to 
distinguish between different consumer purchasing behaviour by the CC
16Precisely, we use information from all postcode sectors for which the mid point of that postcode sector 
is 10 km or less from the centre of the postcode sector under consideration.
17The Competition Commission report suggests that the average distance for a one-stop shopping trip is 
8 miles.
18 We are aware that we have overlapping regions which might bias our estimates. We are investigating 
the direction of a possible bias and also look into isolated areas to check the robustness of our results.
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Table 5.1 shows the number of small stores within postcode sectors and the number 
of large stores within 10k of a postcode sector midpoint. We have truncated the market 
outcome for small stores at five and for large stores at 10. There are very few postcode 
sectors that have 6, 7 and 8 small stores. For large stores the maximum value is 33. As a 
robustness check we also estimate using the non-truncated variable.
5.4.2 Planning applications
Data on the number of planning applications approved comes from the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM). We have information on the number of applications and approval 
for major retail establishments (use class A1 and A3) and change of use. Class A1 contains 
all establishments where one can buy food to consume it elsewhere and A3 is the necessary 
permit for establishment with on-site food consumption. These include not just supermarkets 
but also other large retail sites and restaurants. The data is provided to the ODPM by the 
Local Planning Authorities. It includes: number of new use applications made; number 
of new use applications approved; number of change of use applications made; number of 
change of use applications approved. Figure 5.6 shows the number of decisions granted, 
decided and the approval rate over time. To measure the extend to which the regulation 
poses an entry barrier we use the number of decisions granted. The approval rate seems less 
good a measure since firms may have reacted to the policy and might have applied less for 
out-of-town sites. This is in fine with the decreasing number of application in Figure 5.6.
5.4.3 O ther data
A key contribution of this paper is to control for other demographic variables. The demo­
graphics we focus on include the population, number of single person households, number 
of unemployed people, average distance traveled to work, whether the postcode sector is a 
metropolitan area (and whether it is in London). In the UK these are available from the
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Office of National Statistics at the Output Area /Enumeration District level which is roughly 
half the size of a postcode sector and there are 16,000 in England.19 For earlier years we do 
not have information on distance travelled to work, so we use the total number of cars per 
household to capture mobility and access to a car. We also use the average rateable value 
of retail property, available from the ODPM, and the distance to the supply centers of the 
big four (from IGD).
Descriptive statistics of the variables used appear in Table 5.2.
5.5 R esults
Table 5.3 shows the estimated coefficients from an ordered probit on the number of small 
stores in a postcode sector and the number of large stores within 10 kilometers for cross- 
sections in 1993 and 2002. We estimated our model for every year from 1991 to 2003 and the 
results are very similar. In general the estimates accord with our prior expectations. There 
are more stores in more populated areas. The factors that affect variable profits suggest that 
these are higher for small stores in areas with a large proportion of single person households. 
This captures the fact that single people might have a more uncertain demand for groceries 
and therefore do more of their shopping as top-up shopping in small in-town stores. This 
is confirmed in the estimates for large stores where the proportion of single people effect 
variable profits negatively. Variable profits are lower for small stores in areas where people 
have more access to cars (perhaps picking up an effect that these people are more willing 
to drive to a large store) The effect on for large stores is also positive but even bigger 
reflecting the fact that cars are even more important when doing a large one-stop shopping 
trip. Variable profits also depend on whether a store locates within a metropolitan area or 
in London which both has a negative effect on variable profits (perhaps reflecting higher
19 For the earlier years we use information coded as Enumeration Districts which leads to a lower number 
of overall observations.
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variable costs in these areas). Again this effect is more pronounced for small stores. The 
proportion of unemployed people also effects variable profits in both store formats negative 
this might proxy for lower income or worse access to alternatives.
In terms of fixed costs we see that planning regulations had a statistically significant 
impact on small stores in 1993, but not in 2002. This accords with the policy changes 
described above, up until 1996 planning regulations were on the whole locally determined 
and did not explicitly target small or large store formats. After 1996 there was a national 
mandate that prejudiced against development of large out of town stores and in favour of 
smaller town centre stores. The positive coefficient makes sense - more applications granted 
means lower fixed costs of entry. Here we see a different picture with respect to large store 
formats. There is no effect of planning regulation in 1993 and then a significant effect in 
2002.2°Property have a significant negative effect on variable profits of small stores but seem 
to have little effect on fixed costs of large stores possibly due to cheaper land prices in out- 
of-town locations. Our residual demand hypothesis is also confirmed since the number of big 
stores does have a negative and significant effect on the profits of small firms in all years.
The Vs represent unobservable market structure differences and we would expect them 
to increase with the number of firms in a market. They are significant and increase with 
number of firms the fact that they do increase overproportionally21 indicates that entrants 
into markets with more incumbents have higher fixed costs. But we can’t distinguish whether 
this is true because of lower efficiency or higher entry barriers.
While the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients in Table 5.3 make sense, 
in order to understand the economic significance we need to calculate the marginal effects. 
These are shown in Table 5.4 for our main variable of interest - planning regulations. We 
show the marginal effects for small stores for the outcome of zero stores (an empty market)
20 When we run the regressions for all years this variable is positive and significant in all years for large 
store formats after 1996 except 2000 when it is insignificant.
21 overproportional in the sense of: i f  >  7i-
93
CHAPTER 5. SUPERMARKET ENTRY AND PLANNING REGULATION
and 5 stores (the maximum number) for small stores and 10 stores for large stores.22 For 
comparison Table 5.5 shows the marginal effects from a model where we only include planning 
regulations, and don’t condition on any demographics. The marginal effects for large stores 
are statistically significant from 1997 onwards, though small in magnitude. If we compare 
the effect with the model without demographics the effects look substantially larger, showing 
that omitting to control for variation in demographics and market variables gives a misleading 
picture of the impact of planning regulations and increases its impact tenfold.
To understand the magnitude and the distribution across market types of the effect of 
planning regulation better we additionally undertake the following policy experiment. We 
increase the amount of planning regulations by 10% i.e. a 1/3 additional application approved 
on average in every Local Authority and calculate the marginal effects. The distribution of 
the difference in marginal effects for large stores is shown in Figure 5.7. The negative 
difference in an empty market shows that increasing planning approvals by 10% leads to a 
0.08% decrease in empty markets and an increase in 0.1 % markets with 10 or more large 
stores. We get more markets with 5 or more stores the decrease in entry barrier leads to an 
increase in the number of stores. Is this a big or a small effect in economic terms. To gain 
more insight into the magnitude of the effect we compare it with a 1% increase in population, 
both are contrasted in Figure 5.8. This comparison suggests that planning approvals play a 
significant part in restricting entry of large store formats but the magnitude of the effect is 
rather small.
5.5.1 A sim ple version of observable firm heterogeneity
One important extension to our model is to include firm heterogeneity. We need some 
additional assumptions in order to get existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium 
with firm heterogeneity. We follow Berry (1992) in assuming that firms can be ranked in
22 Interpreting the marginal effects at intermediate rates is tricky as they capture movement from both 
lower and higher groups. We consider this explicitely in our policy experiment.
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terms of their profitability and that ranking does not change when the number or the set of 
entering firms change.
We do this by imposing a single index of profitability Ujk (j  denotes the area and k 
denotes the firm) and it is easy to show that a Nash equilibrium exists in each market but it 
is not a unique one. There are several equilibria which entail the same number of firms which 
we will focus on. To ensure uniqueness of the number of firms in equilibrium we assume that 
firm differences in profitability only affect the fixed portion of profit and thus the post-entry 
pricing game remains symmetric. This is obviously restrictive but more general formulations 
of firm heterogeneity would lead to multiplicity of equilibria. So the resulting profit functions 
looks like this
n nifc =  S(Yj)V(Wj,  a n, (3) -(- F(Rj , j n, 0) -I- ujk +  enj (5-17)
In the most general version the equilibrium number of firms in a market j  has a multinomial 
distribution with the (Nj +  1) distinct and mutually exclusive outcomes. Thus the region of 
integration to obtain the probability of market outcomes given the number of combination 
of firms that lead to e.g. a quadropoly gets increasingly complicated.23 In the most simple 
case we assume that there is no unobserved firm heterogeneity and there is an effectively 
infinite supply of potential entrants. This allows us to include firm heterogeneity into our 
ordered probit model.24
As described above our first approach to include firm heterogeneity is to focus on ob­
servable firm differences. One important observable difference between at least the big four 
supermarkets in the UK is their supply network. We include the distance to the closest 
supply center of the big four supermarket chains (Asda, Sainsbury, Safeway/Morrison and 
Tesco) into our model and assuming that there is no further unobserved heterogeneity we
23For a more detailed analysis see Berry (1992).
24 This places restrictions on possible combinations of entering firms and limits the amount to which firm 
profitability can differ.
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can estimate the profit functions with ordered probit. These results are documented in Ta­
ble 5.7. Since our main focus is on the impact of planning regulation it is reassuring to 
see that the effect is robust to including heterogeneity in distance to the different supply 
networks. The coefficients are jointly significant for large stores and thus do capture some 
of firm heterogeneity. Distance to the closest supply network seems to decrease profits more 
for Safeway/Morrison whereas it does not have a significant impact on the other three.
5.6 Conclusions and future work
This paper develops a model of supermarket entry and applies it to data for the UK. We are 
interested in estimating the cost of restrictive planning regulation. We do this by estimating 
the parameters of the profit function and backing out the increase in fixed costs that is 
associated with more restrictive planning regulations. Our estimates suggest that planning 
regulation did have a statistically significant impact on market equilibrium outcomes and 
that it has represented an entry barrier. However, the economic magnitude of this effect is 
substantially overestimated by not controlling for variation in demographic variables and a 
small number of other variable and fixed cost drivers.
In further work we would like to allow for more flexibility in the profit function, for exam­
ple, by allowing more general heterogeneity between firms and between types and allowing 
for multi-store firms.
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5.7 T ab les and F igures
Table 5.1: Number o f  Stores
Number of stores Small stores in postcode sector Large stores within 10km
1992 2002 1992 2002
0 4,536 4,446 1,210 1,025
1 2,000 2,102 796 541
2 893 948 765 538
3 436 387 714 549
4 153 156 662 640
5 82 61 477 631
6 498 460
7 410 362
8 476 286
9 330 325
10 1,762 2,743
Total 8,100 8,100 8,100
Source IGD
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics
Mean 
(std. dev.)
Mean 
(std. dev.)
Market size 1992 2002
Population in postcode sector (in 1000s) 7.014 6.841
(4.001) (3.924)
Population within 10k (in 1000s) 608 649
(736) (805)
Variable pro fits
singles (% all households) 0.127 0.171
(0.078) (0.098)
families (% all households) 0.192 0.169
(0.055) (0.059)
unemployed people (% all people) 0.031 0.034
(0.019) (0.018)
distance traveled to work (km) 1034
(3.38)
number of cars 0.950
(0.256)
metro area 0.244 0.244
(0.430) (0.430)
London 0.137 0.137
(0.344) (0.344)
Fixed costs
rateable value retail land (£/m2) 52.65 52.65
(89.43) (89.43)
decisions granted 4.229 3.817
(4.866) (4.751)
Source ONS, ODPM, Experian for 2002
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Table 5.3: Coefficients from ordered probit model for number o f  small and large stores
Small stores Large stores
1992 2002 1992 2002
Market size
Population in pc/lOk 0.394 0.208 0.234 0.018
(0.022) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005)
Variable profits
singles in pc/lOk 0.072 0.063 -0.029 -0.034
(0.481) (0.031) (0.001) (0.011)
unemployed people in -0.218 -0.116 -0.143 -0.047
pc/lOk (0.002) (0.129) (0.021) (0.027)
families in pc/lOk -0.297 -0.547 0.033 -0.030
(0.058) (0.045) (0.016) (0.015)
distance traveled to work 0.0004 0.0004
in pc/lOk (0.0006) (0.0001)
number of cars -0.156 -0.014
(0.015) (0.016)
metro area -0.026 -0.011 -0.002 -0.0014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.0004) (0.0006)
London -0.044 -0.042 -0.001 -0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Fixed costs
number of big stores -0.017 -0.009
(0.006) (0.005)
decisions granted (t-1) 0.004 0.0008 0.022 0.034
(0.004) (0.003) (0.018) (0.016)
rateable value retail land -0.115 -0.679 0.051 0.409
(2000) (0.016) (0.140) (0.418) (0.252)
yi 0.790 0.815 0.504 0.801
(0.051) (0.055) (0.126) (0.096)
72 1.601 1.652 1.223 1.433
(0.053) (0.057) (0.160) (0.104)
y3 2.180 2.273 1.868 1.995
(0.056) (0.060) (0.198) (0.116)
y4 2.729 2.789 2.485 2.555
(0.065) (0.065) (0.233) (0.137)
Y5 3.179 3.313 3.100 3.201
(0.073) (0.077) (0.275) (0.156)
y6 3.617 3.838
(0.307) (0.193)
y7 4.202 4.365
(0.343) (0.191)
y8 4.728 4.845
(0.383) (0.198)
y9 5.418 5.274
(0.415) (0.199)
ylO 5.942 5.781
(0.479) (0.218)
R2 0.058 0.065 0.391 0.423
Observations 8096 8096 8096 8096
Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered on Local Authority level
98
CHAPTER 5. SUPERMARKET ENTRY AND PLANNING REGULATION
Table 5.4: Marginal effects o f  decisions granted (t-1) on number o f  small/large storest from Table 5.3
small large
1992 2002 1992 2002
outcome empty market -0.0013 0.0003 -0.00009 -0.977e-06
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.00001)
outcome 5 stores 0.00005 -0.00001
(0.00006) (0.00005)
outcome 10 stores 0.0005 0.0068
(0.0005) (0.0032)
Table 5.5: Marginal effects o f  decisions granted (t-1) from regression with only this variable
small large
1992 2002 1992 2002
outcome empty market 0.0018 0.0044 -0.0092 -0.014
(0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.003)
outcome 5 stores -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002)
outcome 10 stores 0.012 0.028
(0.084) (0.007)
Table 5.6: Differences in supply networks (distance)
Mean 
(std. dev.)
Distance to nearest ASDA supplier (km) 42.90
(35.51)
Distance to nearest Sainsbury supplier (km) 38.18
(37.06)
Distance to nearest Safeway/Morrison supplier (km) 75.95
(43.54)
Distance to nearest Tesco supplier (km) 42.54
(40.81)
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Table 5.7: Coefficients from  ordered probit model with heterogeneity
2002 small 2002 large
Market size
Population in pcs /10k 0.219 0.027
Variable profits
(0.015) (0.004)
singles in pcs /10k 0.045 -0.042
(0.042) (0.013)
unemployed people in -0.139 -0.079
pcs /10k (0.135) (0.028)
families in pcs/10k -0.549 -0.037
(0.046) (0.015)
metro area -0.014 -0.002
(0.005) (0.0007)
London -0.042 -0.135
Fixed costs
(0.006) (0.047)
number big stores -0.015
(0.005)
decisions granted (t-1) 0.0018 0.0345
(0.0039) (0.018)
ASDA dist. Supply net. -0.043 -0.313
(0.090) (0.336)
Tesco dist. Supply net. 0.052 0.471
(0.060) (0.241)
Sainsbury dist. Supply -0.002 -0.042
(0.094) (0.381)
Safeway/Morrison dist. -0.025 -0.351
Supply net. (0.054) (0.159)
yi 0.809 0.391
(0.055) (0.136)
1.645 1.007
(0.057) (0.142)
y3 2.266 1.551
(0.060) (0.148)
y4 2.782 2.095
(0.065) (0.163)
y5 3.306 2.726
(0.077) (0.177)
y6 3.351
(0.209)
y7 3.868
(0.197)
Y8 4.343
(0.201)
y9 4.771
(0.206)
ylO 5.283
(0.229)
R2 0.065 0.418
Observations 8696 8696
Standard errors are reported in brackets and clustered on Local Authority level
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Figure 5.1: Supermarkets in the UK - store openings
400
■o
®  350 
CD
O 300 
CD
O  250 
to 
£ 200 
CD
^  150 O
CD 100 XI
|  50
z
0 p' —
BAIdi ■  Lidl □  Co-op ■  Iceland
□  Kwik Save ■  Somerfield SW aitrose □  Other
□ A sd a □  Safeway/M onisons O Sainsbury's ■  Sainsbury's Central/Local
■  T esco ■  T esco Express/Metro
Figure 5.2: Supermarkets in the UK - store openings by location
by big four (Asda, Sainsbury, Safeway/Morrison, Tesco)
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Figure 5.3: Supermarkets in th
by big four (Asda, Sainsbury, Safeway/Morrison, Tesco)
Source: Authors’ calculations using IGD
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Figure 5.4: Supermarkets in the UK - store openings by company
by big four (Asda, Sainsbury, Safeway/Morrison, Tesco)
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Figure 5.5: Tesco in the UK - store openings by store format
Source: Authors’ calculations using IGD
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Figure 5.7: Impact o f a 10% increase in planning approvals
(Differences in the marginal effects after a 10% increase in planning decisions granted)
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